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THE SPENDING POWER AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER SEBELIUS 
ERIN RYAN* 
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, a 
plurality of the Supreme Court held that portions of the 
Affordable Care Act exceeded federal authority under the 
Spending Clause. With that holding, Sebelius became the first 
Supreme Court decision since the New Deal to limit an act of 
Congress on spending-power grounds, rounding out the “New 
Federalism” limits on federal power first initiated by the 
Rehnquist Court in the 1990s. The new Sebelius doctrine 
constrains the federal spending power in contexts involving 
changes to ongoing intergovernmental partnerships with very 
large federal grants. However, the decision gives little direction 
for evaluating when the amount of change or funding reaches 
the threshold of spending-power coercion. Sebelius thus leaves 
open important unanswered questions about the contours of the 
new limit and how it will impact intergovernmental bargaining. 
 
This Article assesses the Sebelius doctrine by testing its 
application in a legal realm in which spending-power 
bargaining features prominently: federal environmental law. 
Methodically applying the new limit to the major environmental 
programs of cooperative federalism, the analysis concludes that 
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all should withstand legal challenge—even a potentially 
vulnerable provision of the Clean Air Act. The review sheds 
light not only on environmental law after Sebelius, but also the 
many other realms of American governance that engage 
spending-power bargaining, such as public education, civil 
rights law, social service programs, and civic infrastructure. 
The Article concludes that the impacts of the doctrine will be 
most palpable in the dynamics of intergovernmental 
bargaining. States will have more leverage when negotiating 
design and enforcement terms within spending-power 
partnerships. However, the federal government may adapt by 
relying on spending-power bargaining less often and with less 
at stake, even in contexts where states may prefer spending 
partnerships to the alternative. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the Supreme Court ruled in the highly charged 
Affordable Care Act case of 2012, National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 the political arena erupted 
in debate over the implications for health reform and, more 
generally, the reach of federal law. The Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) was designed to reduce costs and facilitate access to 
health insurance by requiring all individuals to participate in 
the insurance pool and by expanding the Medicaid state-federal 
insurance partnership. Writing for a fractured plurality, Chief 
Justice Roberts upheld the Act’s “individual mandate”—the 
famously controversial provision requiring individuals to buy 
health insurance or pay a fine—not under Congress’s well-worn 
authority to regulate interstate commerce, but under its 
sleepier constitutional power to levy taxes.2 
Analysts fixated on the decision’s dueling Commerce 
Clause theories, but an arguably more important element 
involved neither the commerce power nor the tax power 
directly, but its flip side: Congress’s authority to spend tax 
revenue to advance the general welfare. For even as one 
plurality concluded that the Act’s expanded Medicaid program 
was itself constitutional, a different plurality held that plans to 
condition a state’s continued receipt of Medicaid funds on 
assent to the new expansion would exceed federal authority 
under the Spending Clause.3 Chief Justice Roberts concluded 
that Congress could not require participation in the Medicaid 
expansion by states that preferred the existing partnership if 
rejecting the expansion would cause those states to lose critical 
federal funds they had come to rely on.4 That approach would 
amount to unconstitutional coercion, he reasoned, violating the 
principles of federalism and exceeding Congress’s authority to 
 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2. Id. at 2598–2600. 
 3. Id. at 2606–07. 
 4. Id. 
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negotiate with freely consenting states.5 
With that holding, Sebelius became the first Supreme 
Court decision since the New Deal to limit an act of Congress 
on spending-power grounds,6 rounding out the “New 
Federalism” limits on federal power first initiated by the 
Rehnquist Court in the 1990s.7 Complementing earlier 
decisions limiting federal authority under the Commerce 
Clause, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,8 Sebelius completes the 
New Federalism circle by limiting Congress’s ability to bargain 
with the states in policymaking.9 
The Court’s attention to the Spending Clause will please 
critics who have long argued that the other New Federalism 
constraints lack force unless the spending power is also reined 
in, because Congress can sidestep the others by securing state 
action through a spending-power deal.10 However, the same 
critics may be disappointed by the modest impact the doctrine 
is likely to have on overall federal lawmaking. This analysis 
concludes that while the new rule has the potential to alter 
state-federal relations within programs of cooperative 
federalism, few existing laws are likely to change (rendering 
the Sebelius doctrine perhaps ironically consistent with the 
rest of the New Federalism). 
The new doctrine constrains the federal spending power in 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. For discussion of the pre-New Deal case that comes closest, see infra note 
27 (considering United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936)). 
 7. During the “New Federalism” revival, the Rehnquist Court issued a series 
of federalism decisions that established judicially enforceable limits on powers 
constitutionally delegated to the federal government. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM 
AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 1 & n.2 (2012) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism jurisprudence and listing the standard canon of New Federalism 
cases); see also Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: 
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2013) (noting that Sebelius “presented a prime 
opportunity for the Roberts Court to revive the Rehnquist Court’s ‘Federalism 
Revolution’”); Pamela S. Karlan, Comment, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) (discussing the Roberts and Warren Courts’ 
contrasting approaches to managing federal power). 
 8. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 1 & n.2. 
 9. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07. 
 10. E.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the 
Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress 
Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 499–500 (2003); Mitchell N. Berman, 
Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1523–26, 1531–32 (2004). 
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contexts involving ongoing intergovernmental partnerships 
with very large federal grants. Sebelius effectively holds that 
Congress may not condition a state’s receipt of certain federal 
funds within an entrenched spending-power partnership on 
that state’s assent to an independent program—at least when 
the funds at stake are so substantial that the threat of losing 
them coercively undermines state consent.11 The decision, 
however, gives little direction for evaluating when the amount 
of funding exceeds the threshold of coercion, or even when 
changes to an existing program (like Medicaid) amount to a 
new and independent program (as Chief Justice Roberts 
characterized the Medicaid expansion).12 
Sebelius thus leaves important questions unanswered 
regarding the contours of the new spending-power limit and 
how it will impact intergovernmental bargaining in areas of 
jurisdictional overlap.13 These points of uncertainty will 
doubtlessly prompt litigation exploring them in challenges to 
other spending power-based programs of cooperative 
federalism.14 At the same time, federal lawmakers will likely 
adapt to the new constraint by changing the way they structure 
state-federal partnerships in areas of federalism-sensitive 
governance. They may choose to rely on spending-power 
partnerships less often and with less at stake—even in contexts 
where the states may prefer spending partnerships to the 
alternative. 
 
 11. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07. The result differs if an independent 
source of federal authority exists for requiring state performance. See infra notes 
135–36 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Sebelius on conditional 
spending programs that also implicate Congress’s regulatory authority under 
Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also infra Part II.C and notes 108–
10 (discussing how future courts will interpret the precedent resulting from 
Sebelius). 
 12. Id. at 2605–06 (differentiating the expansion as “a shift in kind, not 
merely degree”). 
 13. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 105–80 (discussing jurisdictional overlap) and 
271–314 (discussing federalism bargaining). See generally Erin Ryan, Negotiating 
Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing both). 
 14. In programs of cooperative federalism, the federal and state governments 
take responsibility for interlocking elements of an overarching regulatory 
partnership. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 7, at 92; see also, Gillian E. Metzger, 
Comment, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 106 (2012) 
(detailing the decades long trend in regulatory governance away from “command 
and control” regimes to incentive-based programs that provide states more 
flexibility, while acknowledging the desirability of direct federal regulation in 
some circumstances). 
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This Article assesses the Sebelius doctrine by testing its 
application in a legal realm in which spending-power 
bargaining features prominently: environmental governance. 
Spending partnerships are common among the nation’s major 
environmental laws, which often join state and federal 
regulators in the management of boundary-crossing 
resources—like air, water, and biodiversity—that can only be 
protected through coordinated multilevel governance.15 As 
regulated entities renew their opposition to longstanding 
environmental laws and marshal opposition to new ones, some 
may seek opportunities to challenge them under Sebelius. 
Indeed, attorneys for the State of Texas have already explored 
this possibility in ongoing litigation over new Clean Air Act 
requirements.16 
The following analysis thus reviews the potential impact of 
Sebelius on environmental programs of cooperative federalism. 
The inquiry sheds light not only on environmental law after 
Sebelius, but also on the many other realms of American 
governance that engage spending-power bargaining, such as 
public education partnerships, civil rights law, social service 
programs, and civic infrastructure.17 Exploring how the 
elements of the doctrine intersect with the different varieties of 
environmental partnerships provides a useful model for 
forecasting how the doctrine will interact with similarly 
structured statutes in these other areas of law. In this regard, 
the Article seeks not only to better understand what happens 
to environmental law after Sebelius, but what happens to 
intergovernmental bargaining more generally.18 
 
 15. RYAN, supra note 7, at 145–80 (demonstrating intergovernmental 
interdependence in environmental law); see also Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 70 
(noting the potential impacts of Sebelius on established cooperative-federalism 
programs for education, welfare, environmental protection, highway 
infrastructure, and others); Bradley W. Joondeph, The Health Care Cases and the 
New Meaning of Commandeering, 91 N.C. L. REV. 811, 815–16 (2013) (asserting 
that both the spending and coercion reasoning in Sebelius could jeopardize a 
range of spending-power partnerships and affect federal statutes that 
conditionally preempt state law). 
 16. See Lawrence Hurley, Texas Wastes No Time in Citing Supreme Court 
Health Care Ruling in Clean Air Act Litigation, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Aug. 1, 
2012), http://eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/08/01/1 (reporting on the Utility 
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA case discussed infra in text accompanying note 222). 
 17. See infra notes 119–24 and accompanying text. 
 18. For a fuller discussion of state-federal bargaining in contexts of 
jurisdictional overlap, see generally Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 1 (2011); RYAN, supra note 7, at 265–314. 
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Part I reviews the role of the spending power in 
interjurisdictional governance and the permissible scope of the 
state-federal bargaining it enables. Part II explores the new 
Sebelius limit, focusing on the operation of its three distinct 
elements and the points of uncertainty that remain. Part III 
analyzes how the doctrine intersects with federal 
environmental law, concluding that most (if not all) statutes 
should pass muster. With the possible exception of the Clean 
Air Act, which links states’ receipt of federal highway funds 
with air-quality management obligations, none of the major 
environmental laws appear vulnerable to challenge—and even 
the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act are likely to 
survive Sebelius scrutiny.19 Part IV suggests that although an 
environmental Sebelius challenge is unlikely to prevail, the 
new doctrine nevertheless has the potential to alter the 
substance of cooperative-federalism programs in important 
ways. 
Indeed, the true impact of the doctrine will not be 
measured in litigation outcomes, but in the way it shifts 
leverage within intergovernmental bargaining. The doctrine is 
designed to empower the states, strengthening their position 
against the combined force of federal supremacy and the 
formidable power of the federal purse. However, that leverage 
is only effective if the federal government remains at the 
bargaining table, and if it is able to negotiate with the states 
for what they actually want. The doctrine may reduce federal 
flexibility within spending-power bargaining and overall 
federal reliance on spending partnerships, prompting other 
means of federal lawmaking that engage the states less 
effectively.20 As states often prefer spending deals to the 
alternatives in realms of jurisdictional overlap, it remains 
unclear whether the states—and American federalism more 
generally—will ultimately benefit. 
I. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE SPENDING POWER 
This Part sets the stage for analysis of the Sebelius 
doctrine by reviewing the role of spending-power bargaining in 
 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra notes 249–58 and accompanying text. 
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American federalism and interjurisdictional governance.21 
After introducing the special place of the Spending Clause in 
the context of the federally enumerated powers, it reviews the 
permissible scope of spending-power bargaining before the new 
Sebelius limit. 
A. Sebelius and the Spending Clause 
In the immediate wake of the Sebelius decision, legal 
analysts were most interested in the fact that a majority of the 
Court had rejected the government’s view that the ACA was 
constitutionally authorized under Congress’s commerce 
power.22 Policy analysts were most concerned about the 
practical implications of the new commerce power 
jurisprudence for other programs of cooperative federalism. But 
even setting aside questions about the precedential value of the 
Commerce Clause analysis (given that the Chief Justice’s only 
supporters wrote in dissent),23 the practical implications for 
existing governance are likely to be small, at least in the 
foreseeable future. After all, much of the debate over the 
individual mandate focused on how unprecedented it was: 
despite months of effort, nobody produced a satisfying example 
of a similar legislative tool used in previous health, 
environmental, or any other kind of federal law. 
By contrast, the most immediately consequential portion of 
the ruling—and one with far more significance for most 
regulatory governance—is the part that focuses on the 
Spending Clause,24 in which a plurality of the Court limited the 
federal spending power that authorizes Medicaid and so many 
other state-federal partnerships.25 Congress regularly offers 
funding and other federal resources to persuade the states to 
 
 21. For a fuller discussion of interjurisdictional governance, see RYAN, supra 
note 7, at 105–07 (describing it as regulating matters that legitimately implicate 
both local and national interests or obligations). 
 22. This was the view taken by the Chief Justice and the four conservative 
dissenters in Part III(a). Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2591 (2012). 
 23. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))). 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & amend. XVI. 
 25. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–06 (Part IV(a)). 
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engage in regulatory partnerships addressing matters of mixed 
state and federal interest. Interjurisdictional governance 
frequently takes place within spending power-based programs 
of cooperative federalism, ranging from social welfare programs 
and public education to national security and the interstate 
highway system.26 
Sebelius, however, marks the first time the Court has 
specifically invalidated a congressional act for exceeding its 
power under the Spending Clause,27 and it has important 
implications for the way state-federal regulatory partnerships 
work. 
Spending-power partnerships reflect the complex way that 
the Constitution structures federal power through both specific 
and open-ended delegations of authority. Specifically 
enumerated congressional powers include the authority to coin 
money, establish post offices, and declare war.28 More open-
ended grants of federal authority are conferred by the 
Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses,29 
jointly accounting for vast areas of congressional lawmaking. 
Policymaking realms that are not expressly or implicitly 
covered by delegations to the federal government are 
committed to state jurisdiction.30 
The Spending Clause bridges realms of federal and state 
authority, authorizing Congress to spend money in pursuit of 
 
 26. E.g., RYAN, supra note 7, at 265–72, 288–90. 
 27. Earlier last century, the Supreme Court did something similar in United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), which invalidated the 1933 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act for exceeding Congress’s authority by impermissibly conditioning 
federal farm subsidies on farmers’ agreement to reduce production of specified 
crops. Parts of that holding have been obviated by the Court’s evolving view of the 
Commerce Clause. For further discussion of the case, see infra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5, 7, & 11. 
 29. See id. § 8, cl. 1, cl. 3, cl. 18. To be sure, the Commerce Clause is more 
“specific” in nature than the others (given that it confers federal authority only in 
relation to matters of interstate commerce), but the breadth of authority it creates 
is open-ended in comparison to the narrower zones of federal authority created by 
even more specific grants (e.g., for coining money and establishing post offices). 
 30. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X. There is considerable overlap 
between state and federal jurisdiction, jointly governed by federal restraint and 
federal supremacy, but that’s another story—and a previous American 
Constitution Society essay. See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Erin Ryan, 
Health Care Reform and Federalism’s Tug of War Within, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG 
(June 21, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/health-care-reform-and-federalism% 
E2%80%99s-tug-of-war-within; see also RYAN, supra note 7. 
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the public welfare.31 Congress can fund federal programs 
advancing specific federal responsibilities, such as post offices 
or Naval training, and it can also fund state programs 
operating beyond Congress’s specifically delegated powers, 
such as those addressing public education or domestic violence. 
Congress can fund state programs directly, but it can also offer 
money conditionally—for example, to any state willing to adopt 
a rule or program that Congress would like to see 
implemented.32 In these examples, Congress is effectively 
offering the states a deal: “[H]ere is some money, but for use 
only within this program that we think you should operate” (for 
example, providing health insurance for poor children).33 
B. The Permissible Scope of Spending-Power Bargaining 
In this way, the spending power enables Congress to 
bargain with states for access to policymaking arenas that are 
beyond the reach of its other enumerated powers.34 Congress 
cannot just compel the states to enact its preferred policies in 
realms that exceed its specifically enumerated powers.35 Yet 
spending-power partnerships are premised on negotiation 
rather than compulsion, because states remain free to accept or 
reject the federally proffered deal.36 In other words, if a state 
doesn’t like the attached strings, it doesn’t have to take the 
money. The Sebelius decision likens the spending-power deal to 
a contract, valid when “the State voluntarily and knowingly 
 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 32. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987) (“Incident to this 
power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has 
repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by conditioning 
receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory 
and administrative directives.’”). 
 33. See, e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa–mm (1997). 
 34. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206–07 (“[T]he power of Congress to authorize 
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct 
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”); United States v. Butler, 
297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (“[O]bjectives not thought to be within Article I’s 
‘enumerated legislative fields,’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of 
the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.”). 
 35. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (holding that the 
Tenth Amendment forbids Congress from “commandeering” state participation as 
part of a federal regulatory program). 
 36. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–91 (1937) (rejecting the 
argument that economic incentives are coercive because would-be recipients 
retain “the freedom of the will” to decline). 
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accepts the terms.”37 
Members of the Court have sporadically worried about 
circumstances that might undermine the voluntariness of state 
consent in spending-power bargaining, but usually in dicta and 
without much elaboration.38 For example, in Steward Machine 
Company v. Davis, the Court considered whether the Social 
Security Act of 1935 encroached on constitutionally reserved 
state authority by creating a coercive structure of federal 
taxation.39 The Court briefly considered the argument that 
federal economic pressure could compel the states, but it firmly 
rejected the idea, concluding that “to hold that motive or 
temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law into 
endless difficulties.”40 
Steward Machine appeared to resolve questions about the 
permissible scope of spending-power bargaining that the Court 
had left open one year earlier in United States v. Butler, in 
which it invalidated the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act on 
grounds reminiscent of the concerns raised in Sebelius.41 In a 
holding discredited by subsequent developments in 
constitutional law, the Court invalidated conditional farm 
subsidies and processing taxes for exceeding federal authority 
by coercing individual farmers into reduced agricultural 
production.42 The Court affirmed that the taxing and spending 
powers are not limited by the scope of Congress’s other 
enumerated powers,43 but concluded that Congress had 
nevertheless wielded them here for the unconstitutional ends of 
 
 37. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012). 
 38. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590 (worrying about “the point at 
which pressure turns into compulsion”); Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (citing the scant 
discussion of this point in Steward Machine); cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
1, 74 (1936) (discussed infra, note 41). 
 39. Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 548. 
 40. Id. at 589–91. The Court also distinguished United States v. Butler, 
finding that the specific points of weakness identified in the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act did not apply to the Social Security Act. Id. at 592. 
 41. 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936). 
 42. Butler, 297 U.S. at 74. The Court concluded that Congress lacked 
authority to regulate agricultural production, and that it could not skirt the 
bounds of federal authority by deploying particularized taxes on individual 
farmers this way. Id. (“Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the 
farmer to the ends sought by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that 
it may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase 
compliance.”). 
 43. Id. at 65–66. 
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invading the residual authority preserved to the states.44 
Butler turned on the limits of Congress’s ability to 
influence individuals’ choices through conditional taxes, rather 
than its ability to influence state choices through conditional 
spending (the primary factor in the Sebelius spending-power 
analysis). However, it confronted the analogous concern that 
Congress had exceeded constitutional reach by coercing non-
cooperators into a federally desired course of action by the use 
of economic incentives. Butler is an especially poignant 
historical counterpart to Sebelius given the available parallels 
between the farm taxes and subsidies there invalidated, and 
the individual mandate at issue in the larger ACA controversy. 
Today, Butler leaves an interesting legacy for Sebelius 
interpreters. The Court’s confirmation that the spending power 
operates independently from the other federally enumerated 
powers set the stage for the modern breadth of the doctrine. 
However, other parts of its holding have been obviated by the 
Court’s evolving view of federal authority under both the 
Commerce45 and the Spending Clauses.46 The conservative 
dissenters in Sebelius echo Butler’s concern that the spending 
power not be used to obliterate the constitutional system of 
enumerated powers.47 Yet the intervening seventy-five years of 
precedent starkly rejects Butler’s view that spending-power 
bargaining cannot intrude into areas of reserved state power, 
such as public education, health, or safety.48 
The culmination of that line of precedent is the Court’s 
1987 decision in South Dakota v. Dole, in which it broadly 
upheld the spending bargaining enterprise in a case 
challenging a federal law that conditioned 5 percent of a state’s 
federal highway funds on its adoption of the national drinking 
age.49 Writing for a majority of seven, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
 
 44. Id. at 74–75; see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2599 (describing the 
invalidated tax as a punitive exaction designed to regulate behavior beyond what 
was then considered legitimate federal reach). 
 45. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (affirming that the 
Commerce Clause confers federal authority that would have justified the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
(same). 
 46. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1987) (affirming 
that the Tenth Amendment is not an independent constitutional bar to spending 
power bargaining beyond the reach of Congress’s other enumerated powers). 
 47. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2657 (Scalia, J. et al, dissenting). 
 48. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 210–11. 
 49. Id. at 206–12 (upholding the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, which 
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concluded that neither the Tenth nor the Twenty-first 
Amendments undermined the constitutionality of the National 
Minimum Drinking Age Act, even though Congress could not 
regulate underage alcohol consumption directly.50 In so doing, 
he formally parted ways with all vestiges of the Butler 
analysis. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also found the deal consistent with 
all other previously recognized constraints on conditional 
federal spending,51 including the requirement recently clarified 
in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman52 that 
Congress unambiguously informs the states what would be 
expected of them in exchange for the conditioned funds.53 And 
though the clearly stated obligation to adopt the national 
drinking age was not a direct use of the conditioned highway 
funds, the connection between a uniform national drinking age 
and highway safety was sufficiently germane to satisfy the 
Chief Justice’s scrutiny.54 As he explained, federal highway 
funds are provided to enhance safe interstate travel, and 
highway accidents involving underage drinkers posed a major 
threat to road safety.55 
In cataloguing the history of supportive spending-power 
precedent, Chief Justice Rehnquist summarized the scope of 
congressional authority to bargain with the states pursuant to 
the Spending Clause: 
The spending power is of course not unlimited, but is 
instead subject to several general restrictions articulated in 
our cases. The first of these limitations is derived from the 
language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the 
 
established twenty-one years as the minimum legal age of public alcohol 
consumption). 
 50. Id. at 206–11. 
 51. Id. at 206–08. 
 52. 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1980) (holding conditional funds for care for the 
developmentally disabled unsupported by the Spending Clause because Congress 
had failed to provide clear notice of the obligations that would be required of 
recipient states). 
 53. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
 54. Id. at 208–09. 
 55. Id. (“A Presidential commission appointed to study alcohol-related 
accidents and fatalities on the Nation’s highways concluded that the lack of 
uniformity in the States’ drinking ages created ‘an incentive to drink and drive’ 
because ‘young persons commut[e] to border States where the drinking age is 
lower.’”). 
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spending power must be in pursuit of “the general welfare.” 
In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended 
to serve general public purposes, courts should defer 
substantially to the judgment of Congress. Second, we have 
required that, if Congress desires to condition the States’ 
receipt of federal funds, it “must do so unambiguously . . .  
enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, 
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.” Third, 
our cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) 
that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if 
they are unrelated “to the federal interest in particular 
national projects or programs.”56 
After finding the grant consistent with each of these 
requirements, Chief Justice Rehnquist dispensed with South 
Dakota’s final argument that the grant nevertheless coerced 
the states through the attractive force of much-needed federal 
funds.57 Quoting language made famous in Steward Machine, 
he concluded that the economic incentives created by 
conditional grants do not unconstitutionally coerce the states 
because they continue to exercise free will in making the best 
choices for themselves: 
Every [economic incentive] conditioned upon conduct is in 
some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or 
temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in 
endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is the 
acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which choice 
becomes impossible. Till now the law has been guided by a 
robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will 
as a working hypothesis in the solution of its problems.58 
Characterizing the federal grant at issue as “relatively 
mild encouragement to the States to enact higher minimum 
drinking ages than they would otherwise choose,” he pointed 
out that “the enactment of such laws remains the prerogative 
of the States not merely in theory but in fact.”59 
 
 56. Id. at 207 (internal citations omitted). 
 57. Id. at 208–09. 
 58. Id. at 211–12 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–91 
(1937)). 
 59. Id. at 211–12. 
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Dole thus affirmed that spending-power deals are 
constitutional so long as the conditions (1) promote the general 
welfare, (2) are unambiguous, (3) are reasonably related 
(“germane”) to the federal interest, and (4) do not induce 
independent constitutional violations.60 No law has ever run 
afoul of Dole’s broad limits,61 which have not since been 
revisited—until now. 
II. THE NEW SEBELIUS SPENDING-POWER LIMIT 
This Part explores the Sebelius doctrine and how it alters 
the permissible scope of state-federal bargaining under the 
Spending Clause. After reviewing the Court’s disposition of the 
spending-power claim in the case, it isolates the primary 
elements of the new doctrine and the multiple points of 
uncertainty it leaves for future interpreters, closing with a 
critique. 
A. The Sebelius Spending-Power Holding 
In challenging the ACA, twenty-six states argued that 
Congress had overstepped its bounds by effectively forcing 
them to accept a significant expansion of Medicaid, the state-
administered but mostly federally funded public health 
insurance program.62 Before the ACA, Medicaid required that 
participating states offer health insurance to discrete 
categories of vulnerable people, including pregnant women, 
children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the dis-
abled.63 The ACA amendments required states to extend 
insurance to the general population of people under age sixty-
five with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty 
line.64 
All states currently participate in the Medicaid 
partnership, but those that did not extend insurance to the 
larger population anticipated by the ACA would be out of 
 
 60. Id. at 206. 
 61. See, e.g., Pierce Cnty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146 (2003) 
(rejecting a challenge prompting the Court to revisit the Dole spending power 
limits in a case about highway funding that was ultimately upheld under 
Congress’s commerce power). 
 62. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2580, 2601. 
 63. Id. at 2601. 
 64. Id. 
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compliance with the new terms of the program. A longstanding 
provision specifies that the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services may withhold all Medicaid funds to any state failing to 
comply with any Medicaid requirement.65 The plaintiff states 
feared losing that substantial source of funding—on average, 
about 10 percent of their annual budgets—if they rejected the 
ACA expansion.66 
Reflecting the Court’s previous emphasis on the states’ free 
will in spending-power bargaining,67 the federal government 
defended the conditioned Medicaid funds as a conditional gift 
that states remain free to take or refuse as best serves their 
interests.68 Congress even had included a provision in the 
original Medicaid legislation expressly stating that it could 
modify the program from one year to the next, so the defendant 
agency argued that the states had always been on notice that 
the terms of the ongoing spending-power deal would change 
from time to time.69 In fact, Congress had previously modified 
Medicaid nearly fifty times since its inception,70 suggesting 
that the additional changes here were unremarkable in the 
context of the full Medicaid partnership. 
The plaintiff states maintained that the ACA expansion 
was different, however, because the changes were much more 
serious, and because they could not now disentangle from this 
critical social service program on which their citizens had come 
to rely.71 They argued that conditioning their continued access 
to needed Medicaid funds on their assent to the new expansion 
would be unconstitutionally coercive, because they could not 
realistically refuse if it meant losing 10 percent of their annual 
budget.72 This was not the “relatively mild” economic incentive 
upheld in Dole, they argued, and though they may have been 
free to reject the Medicaid expansion in theory, they were not 
 
 65. Id. at 2607. 
 66. See id. at 2582, 2605. 
 67. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987). 
 68. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06. 
 69. Id. at 2605, 2631. The Social Security Act, which includes Medicaid, 
includes a clause expressly reserving “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any 
provision” of that statute. Id. at 2605 (quoting Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1304 (1935)). 
 70. Id. at 2630–31 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing this provision and the 
fifty amendments that have been made to Medicaid since 1965). 
 71. See id. at 2603–05. 
 72. See id. at 2603, 2605. 
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free to do so in fact.73 They alleged that their consent to the 
expansion would be effectively involuntary.74 With no ability to 
foresee this substantial change in the direction of Medicaid, 
they had become unfairly trapped in dependence on the 
existing program. 
Holding for the plaintiffs on this point, a strained plurality 
of the Court stated a new rule limiting the scope of Congress’s 
spending power in the context of an ongoing partnership of 
substantial means.75 Joined only by Justices Breyer and 
Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts began by upholding the 
presumption underlying spending-power bargaining—that is, 
that it does not coerce the states because they can always walk 
away from the bargaining table if they do not like the terms of 
the deal.76 As he explained, concerns about federal coercion are 
usually dispelled by relying on the states to “just say no” when 
they don’t like the proposed federal terms, wryly observing that 
“[t]he States are separate and independent sovereigns. Some-
times they have to act like it.”77 The Medicaid expansion would 
therefore be constitutional in isolation because states that did 
not want to participate in it could simply choose not to. No 
coercion, no constitutional problem. 
But then the decision takes a key turn. There would be 
unconstitutional coercion, the Chief Justice explained, if 
Congress could penalize states opting out of the Medicaid 
expansion by cancelling their existing programs.78 The 
Medicaid partnership has become so entrenched, he wrote, that 
punishing a state’s decision to reject an unforeseeable change 
by denying funds for its existing program would leave that 
state no genuine opportunity to decline the new deal.79 If it 
would be realistically impossible to say “no” to unfairly 
conditioned new terms, a state that says “yes” cannot be 
 
 73. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 
2604–05 (applying this language from Dole to the facts in Sebelius). 
 74. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605. 
 75. Id. at 2603–06. 
 76. See id. at 2602–03. 
 77. Id. at 2603. 
 78. See id. at 2607. The Chief Justice’s opinion was joined by Justices Breyer 
and Kagan. Dissenting Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito completed 
the plurality by agreeing that the Medicaid expansion should be invalidated for 
exceeding the spending power, but under a different rationale (tying coercion 
primarily to the size of the grant). See id. at 2666. Because the Chief Justice’s 
rationale is narrower than that of the dissenting justices, his controls. 
 79. See id. at 2605, 2607. 
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considered to consent voluntarily. Any agreement thus 
procured is one made coercively, under duress.80 
The Chief Justice’s coercive conditions analysis—roughly 
holding that Congress may not pressure a state to accept a new 
spending-power deal by threatening to terminate independent 
grants on which the state already relies81—required two 
critical interpretive moves. 
First, he had to distinguish Dole. After all, the spending 
deal upheld in Dole had also conditioned ongoing funds for one 
purpose (highway maintenance) on participation in an 
indirectly related program (a national drinking age).82 If 
independent conditions like these create constitutional 
difficulties, then the entire line of Spending Clause cases 
premised on Dole becomes suspect. 
To resolve this potential problem, Chief Justice Roberts 
distinguished Dole and its progeny on the grounds that the 
Medicaid grants at issue in Sebelius were simply so much 
larger in size.83 The plaintiff states may have willingly chosen 
to participate in the original Medicaid program, but they were 
now being “economic[ally] dragoon[ed]” into the expansion by 
the threatened loss of so large a percentage of their annual 
budgets.84 In contrast to valid spending-power programs that 
attract meaningful state consent by offering directly related 
federal funds, he concluded that the ACA—coupling an 
invitation to the new partnership with the threatened loss of 
funding for the old partnership—procured state consent by “a 
gun to the head.”85 
Second, and equally important, to make the “independent 
conditions” part of his analysis work, the Chief Justice had to 
construe acceptance of the Medicaid expansion as an 
“independent condition,” not one organically related to the use 
of the funds at issue. To accomplish this, he characterized 
Congress’s new vision of Medicaid as really being two separate 
programs: (1) the pre-existing program, requiring health 
 
 80. Id. at 2604. 
 81. Id. at 2603–04. 
 82. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987). The Dole condition 
was considered indirectly related because highway maintenance grants are made 
to enhance highway safety, and lowering the drinking age would also enhance 
highway safety. Id. 
 83. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 2604. 
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insurance for discrete categories of vulnerable people; and (2) 
the “independent” expansion, requiring insurance for the 
general low-income population.86 
While a joint dissent by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
and Alito tied coercive abuse of the spending power primarily 
to the size of the federal grant at issue, the Chief Justice 
located coercion in the combined force of the size of the grant 
and the conditioning of that grant on assent to the terms of an 
unrelated program.87 His opinion thus differentiates between 
Congress (a) permissibly encouraging state policy choices by 
restricting even a large federal grant to a specified use, and (b) 
impermissibly coercing the same policy choice by restricting 
receipt of a large grant for an independent use: 
We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the 
receipt of funds on the States’ complying with restrictions 
on the use of those funds, because that is the means by 
which Congress ensures that the funds are spent according 
to its view of the “general Welfare.” Conditions that do not 
here govern the use of the funds, however, cannot be 
justified on that basis. When, for example, such conditions 
take the form of threats to terminate other significant 
independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a 
means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.88 
As for the ACA, coercion was evident because receipt of the 
large existing Medicaid grant was made conditional on a state’s 
assent to the independent expansion. The Medicaid expansion 
was an independent program, he reasoned, because no state 
could have foreseen that the original program it accepted would 
evolve from one to insure “the neediest among us” to “an 
element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal 
health insurance coverage.”89 For the Chief Justice, the 
universality of the new plan appears to have strained the 
trajectory of the original partnership beyond foreseeability by 
 
 86. Id. at 2601 (“The current Medicaid program requires states to cover only 
certain discrete categories of needy individuals—pregnant women, children, needy 
families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled.”). 
 87. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the 
Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 866–73 (2013) (contrasting the 
analyses of the Chief Justice and the joint dissent on this point). 
 88. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–04. 
 89. Id. at 2606. 
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the plaintiff states—justifying its treatment by the Court as an 
independent program, despite its characterization by Congress 
as an expansion of the existing program. 
On this point, the Chief Justice’s analysis appears to draw 
on the second criterion of Dole, requiring that federal 
conditions be stated unambiguously to the states.90 This 
requirement preserves the integrity of state consent in 
spending-power bargaining by ensuring that states are fully 
enabled to make independent choices in their best interest. The 
Sebelius doctrine thus attempts to secure the foundations of 
genuine state consent by preventing Congress from 
(purposefully or inadvertently) luring a state into dependence 
on a spending-power deal that evolves from an unambiguous 
beginning into an unforeseeable end. 
As Justice Ginsburg suggests in dissent, however, this 
primary point of contact between the Chief Justice’s analysis 
and the leading spending-power precedent to this point is one 
of relatively few such points of contact.91 An even stronger 
analysis might have elaborated more fully on how Sebelius 
follows from Dole’s other elements, and how the various 
constraints should work together going forward.92 
B. The Elements of the Sebelius Analysis 
The Sebelius analysis thus appears to hinge on three 
moving parts, each of which must be manifest before 
unconstitutional coercion is found. First, there must be an 
ongoing spending-power partnership in which states have 
 
 90. Id. at 2634 n.18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting, perhaps disdainfully, 
that the relationship between the Chief Justice’s opinion and Dole seems limited 
to the fact that he “appears to rely heavily” on the second Dole criterion). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Sebelius’s neglect of Dole is surprising, given its central place in Spending 
Clause jurisprudence. Then again, Sebelius was a historic decision in which Chief 
Justice Roberts was largely viewed as taking either heroic or anti-heroic steps 
(depending on one’s point of view) to avoid toppling seventy-five years’ worth of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Roberts Chooses 
Restraint Over History on Obamacare, BLOOMBERG VIEW, June 28, 2012, 
available at http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-06-28/roberts-chooses-
restraint-over-history-on-obamacare. He was apparently less uneasy about 
unsettling the same period’s accumulation of Spending Clause jurisprudence, but 
perhaps his avoidance of deeper engagement with the existing constraints reflect 
a related desire to assert this result while leaving as much prior case law intact as 
possible. Whatever its origin, the result is that Sebelius lacks a more satisfying 
integration with preceding spending power precedent.  
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formed reasonable reliance interests—such that later 
congressional changes could constitute an unfair surprise to a 
state that voluntarily became entrenched under an acceptable 
set of rules but must now contend with an unacceptable set.93 
Here, the plaintiff states argued that this had been their fate 
under Medicaid, which had seemed like a reasonable 
partnership in the beginning but became unreasonable after 
the ACA amendments.94 
Second, the change must condition continued funds within 
the entrenched program on assent to terms that do not directly 
relate to how those original funds are to be used—for example, 
conditioning funds for existing Medicaid populations on 
coverage for new populations.95 And finally, the funding at 
issue must be so large and the impact of losing it so dire for a 
state that its capitulation to the new terms constitutes coerced 
assent rather than voluntary agreement.96 
Accordingly, and consistent with both new and old 
spending-power jurisprudence, Congress could have lawfully 
conditioned funds to directly support the new Medicaid 
expansion on a state’s agreement to implement those (and only 
those) programs. Even though the expansion is intended to 
become an ongoing partnership over time, at the moment of its 
creation it would be a new program in which the states could 
not yet have formed reliance interests. And even though the 
funds at issue might be enormous, the conditions attached to 
those funds would govern their use directly and 
straightforwardly, without impacting the pre-existing Medicaid 
program. 
Sebelius affirms that Congress remains free to directly 
condition the disbursement of large federal grants as it wishes, 
subject only to the forgiving Dole limitations.97 The ACA was 
coercive, however, because it indirectly conditioned pre-existing 
funds by making their continued receipt contingent on 
independent state obligations. The Chief Justice held that 
Congress may not procure state acceptance of the Medicaid 
expansion by threatening to defund pre-existing operations of 
 
 93. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–06. 
 94. See id. at 2601, 2603. 
 95. Id. at 2603–04. 
 96. Id.; see also Bagenstos, supra note 87, at 874–76. 
 97. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607. 
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the original program.98 
To remedy the defect, Chief Justice Roberts held that the 
provision entitling the Secretary to withhold all Medicaid 
funding for failure to comply with any Medicaid requirement 
could not apply to states rejecting the ACA expansion.99 The 
four conservative justices agreed with the result, though not 
the rationale, while Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor agreed 
only that the stricken penalty provision was severable. The 
ultimate ruling left the ACA intact while requiring the federal 
government to allow dissenting states to opt out of the 
Medicaid expansion while remaining in the pre-existing 
Medicaid program.100 
Justice Ginsburg excoriated the Chief Justice’s logic in a 
dissent joined by Justice Sotomayor, arguing that there was 
only one program before the Court: Medicaid.101 For her, the 
expansion simply adds beneficiaries to what is otherwise the 
same partnership, same purpose, same means, and same 
administration: “a single program with a constant aim—to 
enable poor persons to receive basic health care when they 
need it.”102 She argued that neither the facts nor precedent 
supported the Chief’s distinction between the pre-existing 
Medicaid program and the ACA expansion on the basis of 
whether the expansion was foreseeable at the outset of the 
state-federal partnership.103 
Justice Ginsburg also argued that the new doctrine—
though purportedly designed to enhance state autonomy—
would have the more likely effect of limiting it, because the 
alternative to state-federal spending-power bargaining is often 
federal fiat.104 To discourage intergovernmental bargaining of 
this sort is to lose one of the more effective means of engaging 
state input in federalism-sensitive governance.105 Most 
importantly, she criticized the Chief Justice for enforcing a new 
limitation on coercion without clarifying the point at which 
 
 98. Id. at 2606–07. 
 99. Id. at 2607–08. 
 100. For a fuller analysis of the binding precedent that follows from this ruling, 
see infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text. 
 101. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2635–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 2630. 
 103. Id. at 2637–38. 
 104. Id. at 2632–33 (“The alternative to conditional federal spending, it bears 
emphasis, is not state autonomy but state marginalization.”). 
 105. Id. 
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permissible persuasion gives way to undue coercion.106 In 
passionate terms, she warned of the myriad ways in which this 
inquiry requires “political judgments that defy judicial 
calculation.”107 
C. Interpreting the Sebelius Doctrine 
The Sebelius decision leaves much uncertainty in its wake. 
The array of concurring and dissenting opinions complicates 
efforts to determine exactly how the decision will bind future 
courts, as no rationale was supported by a majority of the 
court.108 In Marks v. Whitney, the Supreme Court established 
that, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’”109 Here, seven 
members of the court—the plurality and the conservative 
dissenters—concluded that the ACA violated the Spending 
Clause, and the Chief Justice’s rationale constitutes the 
narrowest grounds on which they all agreed.110 
As a technical matter, however, the conservative 
dissenters did not actually concur in the judgment, so their 
view may not count toward binding precedent under Marks. 
Meanwhile, the liberal dissenters concurred in the severance 
portion of the Chief Justice’s analysis, but not in the conclusion 
that the Spending Clause had been violated. For this reason, 
one could argue that the Sebelius doctrine does not constitute 
fully binding precedent. Yet as a practical matter, future courts 
will follow the rationale they expect a majority of the court to 
support, and the Chief Justice’s rationale is the narrowest that 
 
 106. Id. at 2640–41; see also Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and Its 
Discontents, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1937, 1939–40 (2013) (citing Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent in Sebelius as a significant development for collective-action theory for 
“deem[ing] the logic of collective action constitutionally pertinent to the scope of 
Congress’s commerce power”). Professor Siegel emphasizes Justice Ginsburg’s 
simultaneous arguments “that Congress could have rationally concluded that the 
conduct of the uninsured, as a general class, substantially affects interstate 
commerce,” and that “the scope and the nature of the problem rendered the 
federal government better situated than the states to solve it.” Id.  
 107. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 108. Marks v. Whitney, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Bagenstos, supra note 87, at 868. 
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commanded the accord of the seven justices who found a 
spending-power problem.111 This analysis therefore presumes 
that the elements of the Chief Justice’s analysis are the 
elements that will matter to future interpreters. 
Even so, the Chief Justice’s rationale creates considerable 
uncertainty of its own. It is striking that such a landmark 
decision, establishing a wholly new constitutional limit, 
provides so little guidance about when that limit is exceeded. 
The Chief Justice would find coercion when both the size of a 
recurring grant and its intersecting conditions make it 
realistically impossible for a state to refuse112—but his opinion 
offers neither a threshold nor a limiting principle for 
evaluating coerciveness in either manifestation. Punting on the 
most critical points of the analysis, he merely observed that 
previous justices had not attempted to “fix a line” between 
persuasion and coercion, and so neither would he.113 Yet prior 
decisions upheld challenged legislation under the spending 
power,114 while Sebelius articulates a new constitutional 
limit—arguably creating responsibility to do more.115 
Nevertheless, Sebelius interpreters must make sense of the 
new constitutional limit with precious little direction. The 
primary sources of uncertainty involve: (a) the point at which a 
federal grant becomes large enough to exert coercive effect on a 
state, and (b) the point at which changes to an ongoing 
spending partnership create independent obligations for 
continued receipt of the original funds, or “crossover 
conditions.” 
 
 111. See id. at 868, n.24 (“But even though the aggregation of votes across 
those who joined the Court’s judgment and those who dissented ‘does not establish 
any authoritative legal propositions’ that bind the lower courts, as a practical 
matter, lower courts can be expected to seek to identify and apply those 
propositions that would command the assent of five Justices to avoid reversal.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 112. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–05 (applying the “reality” criterion in the 
context of the ACA). 
 113. Id. at 2606 (“The Court found it ‘[e]nough for present purposes that 
wherever the line may be, this statute is within it.’ We have no need to fix a line 
either. It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely 
beyond it.”) (citation omitted). 
 114. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
 115. Cf. Huberfeld et al., supra note 7, at 8 (discussing how Justice Roberts 
and the joint dissent “expressly declined to articulate any test or rubric for 
deciding whether a Spending Clause program crosses the coercion line,” offering 
mere “slogans” that are “conspicuously fact specific and provide little guidance to 
future courts and litigants.”). 
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1. Size of the Grant 
 The Sebelius doctrine’s first indicator for potential coercion 
is the large size of an ongoing federal grant, but the decision 
provides dauntingly weak tools for identifying when this 
threshold is exceeded. The only guideposts for analysis are the 
decision’s affirmation that the $614 million in highway funds 
at issue in Dole (less than half of 1 percent of the state’s overall 
budget) were too small for the threat of loss to be coercive, 
coupled with its holding that the threatened loss of $233 billion 
in Medicaid grants (on average, 10 percent of a state’s budget) 
sufficed.116 The highway funds at issue in Dole represented 
0.19 percent of combined state expenditures that year, while 
the Medicaid funds at issue in Sebelius represented 21.86 
percent of all state expenditures that year.117 
We can probably conclude that any federal grants smaller 
than the size-related threshold of safety set by Dole will pass 
muster, while those larger than the Medicaid grants at issue in 
Sebelius will not. However, there are no federal grants larger 
than those at issue in Sebelius: Medicaid includes the largest of 
all federal grants to states, followed by those for public 
education and then highways.118 
The doctrine thus leaves the many federal grant programs 
in the zone between 0.5 to 10 percent of a state’s budget on 
uncertain ground for the purposes of Sebelius scrutiny—
including those relating to public education,119 civil rights,120 
 
 116. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (identifying the federal funds at issue in 
Dole and Sebelius). 
 117. Id. at 2664 (Scalia, J., et al., dissenting) (“In South Dakota v. Dole, the 
total amount that the States would have lost if every single State had refused to 
comply with the 21-year-old drinking age was approximately $614 million—or 
about 0.19% of all state expenditures combined. Under the ACA, by contrast, the 
Federal Government has threatened to withhold 42.3% of all federal outlays to the 
states, or approximately $233 billion . . . equaling 21.86% of all state expenditures 
combined.”). 
 118. Id. at 2663–64 (noting that education grants are second only to Medicaid 
in size, comprising 9.8 percent of total state spending); see also NAT’L ASS’N. OF 
STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, FISCAL YEAR 2010 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT             
62 (2011), available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/Summary%20% 
20State%20Expenditure%20Report_2.pdf and http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/ 
files/2010%20State%20Expenditure%20Report_0.pdf [hereinafter “NASBO FY 
2010 REPORT”] (summary and full report, respectively, describing federal 
contributions to state expenditures and showing that total transportation funds 
comprised 7.7 percent of total state spending that year, second only to education). 
 119. E.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2013) 
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highway infrastructure,121 social services,122 affordable 




(reauthorizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 USC § 
6301). Federal grants for elementary and secondary public education totaled 
$70.678 billion in FY 2010. NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 16. Note 
that a subsequent NASBO Report has become available since the Supreme 
Court’s citations to the 2010 data in Sebelius, but this Article relies on the 2010 
data to remain consistent with the Sebelius benchmarks. 
 120. E.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1–2000e-
17 (2013) (conditioning federal funds on state promises not to discriminate on the 
basis of race, sex, disability, and other proscribed categories); Title IX of 
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1683 (conditioning federal 
educational grants on gender equity in implementation); Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (grants to states to support 
the education of children with disabilities); DEPT. OF EDUC., SPECIAL EDUCATION: 
FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST I-16 (2012), available at http://www2.ed. 
gov/about/overview/budget/budget12/justifications/i-specialed.pdf (reporting that 
federal grants through IDEA were $11,505,211,000 in FY 2009 and FY 2010). 
 121. NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 62 (describing federal grants 
for transportation, totaling $124.4 billion in 2010). 
 122. E.g., Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind & Disabled, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1381–1382e(a) (2013) (grants to states to offer assistance to qualifying persons; 
these grants totaled $48 billion in 2009. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) PROGRAM       
(2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3367)); Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 
2013 (grants to states to provide food stamps to qualifying persons, totaling $74.6 
billion in 2012, according to SNAP Monthly Data, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOOD & 
NUTRITION SERV. (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/34snapmonthly. 
htm); Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 42 U.S.C. § 603 (grants 
to states to offer assistance to qualifying poor families, from an annual block grant 
totaling $16.5 billion, according to GENE FALK, CRS REPORT, THE TEMPORARY 
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) BLOCK GRANT: RESPONSES TO 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/RL32760.pdf); Grants to States for Old-Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
301–306 (allocated at the discretion of the Secretary). 
 123. E.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2013) (Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968) (providing federal grants to states for affordable housing 
projects, totaling $612 million in 2010, according to NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, 
supra note 118, at 85). 
 124. See infra Part III (describing impacted environmental laws in detail) and 
NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 84 (all federal grants for 
environmental expenditures, totaling $1.5 billion in 2010). State capital 
expenditures for environmental purposes in 2010 composed 5.9 percent of total 
capital spending. Id. at 79. 
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The Sebelius Zone of Coercive Size Uncertainty 
 
 Persuasion ? ? ? Coercion 
   
 Dole Grant Sebelius Grant 




% Total State Expenditures: 0.19% 21.86% 
% of Single State Budget: > 0.5% (South 
Dakota) 
10% on average 
   
 Persuasion ? ? ? Coercion 
 
 
Indeed, the Sebelius upper threshold is itself loosely 
calculated: the Chief Justice appears to derive the 10 percent 
figure associated with the Medicaid grant by simply adjusting 
the average state budget’s proportion of Medicaid spending (20 
percent) by the lower range estimate of the average federal 
contribution (50 to 83 percent).126 50 percent of 20 percent 
yields a threshold of coercion at approximately 10 percent of a 
state’s annual budget, but later interpreters are left longing for 
something more determinative of coercion than cocktail-napkin 
math. The difficulty of establishing more precisely where 
persuasion gives way to coercion is surely one reason the Court 
has declined to do so previously, reluctant to impose a 
discretionary constraint so vague that it can only exacerbate 
the existing uncertainty in federalism-sensitive lawmaking and 
litigation. 
 
 125. Dole’s $614 million in 1987 dollars would amount to $1.2 billion inflation-
adjusted dollars in 2012. See, e.g., US Inflation Calculator, COINNEWS MEDIA 
GROUP, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (based on the consumer price index) 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 126. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–05 (2012) 
(“Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State’s total 
budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.” (citing 
NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 11, Table 5). I searched the opinion 
but was unable to determine any other source for the Chief Justice’s use of this 10 
percent figure. 
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2. Crossover Condition 
 The Sebelius doctrine also requires that interpreters 
distinguish (1) conditional funds that directly sponsor the 
program in question from (2) federal funds sponsoring one 
program that are conditioned on state participation in another 
program. While the former remain presumptively permissible, 
the latter are potentially coercive under the new limit. 
Remarkably, the decision provides no means at all for 
evaluating when programmatic amendments are within the 
permissible threshold of statutory evolution and when they 
amount to an independent program triggering Sebelius 
scrutiny. The plurality acknowledged this problem in conceding 
that Congress enacted the ACA as an amendment to the same 
Medicaid statute that the federal and state governments have 
jointly implemented for decades, but concluded that it need not 
defer to Congress’s judgment about the boundaries between 
legislative programs.127 Beyond noting that Congress cannot 
just “surprise” states with “retroactive conditions,”128 the 
decision provides no tools for determining when modifications 
to an existing program create an independent program 
vulnerable to the new limit.129 
D. Critiquing Sebelius 
This second zone of uncertainty is an especially troubling 
feature of the new rule. When the Court creates a new doctrine 
in uncharted constitutional territory, it may be an exercise in 
judicial prudence to say no more than is necessary to allow the 
 
 127. Id. at 2605 (“We cannot agree that existing Medicaid and the expansion 
dictated by the Affordable Care Act are all one program simply because ‘Congress 
styled’ them as such. If the expansion is not properly viewed as a modification of 
the existing Medicaid program, Congress’s decision to so title it is irrelevant.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 128. Id. at 2606 (noting that the spending power does not enable Congress to 
“surpris[e] participating States with post-acceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions’”). 
 129. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid 
Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 1283, 1286–89 (2013) (approving the result in Sebelius but not the rationale, 
and proposing his own framework for analyzing conditional grants). Professor 
Berman’s work distinguishes between the anti-compulsion and anti-coercion 
principles and argues that the government “unconstitutionally penalizes the 
exercise of a right if it withholds a benefit for certain bad purposes or reasons.” Id. 
at 1288. 
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gradual, case-by-case process of judicial refinement to begin its 
work. That said, Sebelius falls short of what is necessary. 
Constitutional interpretation draws on the common law 
tradition that enables the incremental development of legal 
principles, but even the common law tradition anticipates 
judicial discretion within bounds. When the Court creates a 
new rule, that Court is responsible for providing those bounds. 
Further development of the principle can take place through 
judicial elaboration over time—in other words, one doesn’t have 
to decide everything all at once—but when innovating from 
scratch, there is an obligation to at least articulate meaningful 
limiting principles. 
The Sebelius spending-power holding absolves itself of too 
much. It creates principles without discernable limits, leaving 
too much uncertainty for future interpreters in all branches of 
both state and federal government. It engages existing 
precedent in a cavalier manner, lacking the more satisfying 
integration with principal case law that one might expect from 
a new constitutional statement that does not purport to 
overrule prior cases. It gives no deference to Congress’s 
conceptualization of Medicaid as a legislative whole, even 
though the case turns on this issue of conceptual labeling, and 
despite Dole’s admonishment that courts should give 
“substantial” deference to Congress in evaluating spending-
power constraints.130 
In the end, “I know it when I see it” reasoning won’t do 
when assessing the labyrinthine political dimensions of 
 
 130. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Chief Justice twice declined deference to 
Congress’s own characterization of what it was doing in the Sebelius decision, first 
when he held that the individual mandate was a tax rather than a penalty (as 
Congress had characterized it), Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95, 2597–98; and 
here, when he held the Medicaid expansion was an independent program rather 
than an amendment (as Congress had characterized it), id. at 2605. While courts 
are not bound by the mere form of legislative language, it is striking that the 
Chief Justice was unmoved by the usual norms of judicial-legislative deference 
even when the crucial issues of the case turned on questions of congressional 
labeling. 
Moreover, while he found the individual mandate a hard question in part 
because of Congress’s chosen terminology, he had no such qualms disregarding 
Congress’s legislative conceptualization for the purposes of the spending analysis: 
“We cannot agree that existing Medicaid and the expansion dictated by the 
Affordable Care Act are all one program simply because ‘Congress styled’ them as 
such. If the expansion is not properly viewed as a modification of the existing 
Medicaid program, Congress’s decision to so title it is irrelevant.” Id.  
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intergovernmental bargaining under the spending power, but 
neither the Chief Justice nor the more conservative dissenters 
provide more than that in their various assertions that such a 
limit must exist. As it stands, the decision effectively leaves 
any major, ongoing spending-power partnership improved by 
experience vulnerable to legal challenge under Sebelius, and 
purely at the discretion of the reviewing court. Yet, as Justice 
Ginsburg warns, it is highly dubious for the Court to assume 
institutional responsibility for determining the overall 
structure of complex regulatory programs, especially with no 
deference to legislative conclusions. In so doing, the reviewing 
Court substitutes its judgment for that of Congress in an 
enterprise in which legislative capacity apexes while judicial 
capacity hits its nadir.131 
Moreover, the rule threatens to be unworkable in 
implementation given legislative norms. No present Congress 
can bind future congressional choices,132 so every ongoing 
spending-power deal is necessarily limited to its budgetary 
year as a matter of law. Programs are renewed on an annual 
basis, with amendments as needed to adjust for changing social 
circumstances. But after Sebelius, Congress can never modify a 
vulnerable partnership like Medicaid without potentially 
creating two tracks—one for states that like the change, and 
another for those that prefer the original (and with further 
modifications, three tracks, ad infinitum). The next time 
Congress decides to modify Medicaid—perhaps with insight 
gleaned from its experience with the ACA expansion—will it be 
required to manage three separate systems, to protect the 
choices of states that preferred the original Medicaid system, 
the ACA expansion, and now the new modification? 
Perhaps the saving grace of the unworkable opinion is that 
its own vagueness could ultimately confine it to its facts—
making Sebelius the Bush v. Gore133 of spending-power 
jurisprudence. Given the enormous uncertainties associated 
with applying the rule, it may be that it will affect future 
changes only to the one statute we already know is vulnerable: 
 
 131. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2639–41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) 
(affirming the “centuries-old concept that one legislature may not bind the 
legislative authority of its successors”). 
 133. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (resolving the dispute over the 2000 presidential 
election in a decision explicitly confining its reach to the facts at hand). 
RYAN_AUTHORRETURN 5/31/2014 2:28 PM 
2014] SPENDING POWER AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1033 
Medicaid. After all, Medicaid is unique among cooperative-
federalism programs for both its enormous size and its 
uncertain footing in sources of federal authority beyond the 
spending power (at least under the limited view of the 
commerce authority embraced elsewhere in Sebelius by the 
Chief Justice and the conservative dissenters). Federal grants 
for state primary and secondary education are the next largest 
after Medicaid, and even in states with smaller than average 
Medicaid grants, Medicaid grants are at least twice the size of 
federal educational funding as a percentage of total state 
expenditures.134 
Vulnerable provisions that condition federal educational 
funds on potentially “independent” conditions may also be 
upheld under independent sources of federal authority even if 
they prove infirm under the spending-power limit.135 For 
example, civil rights laws like Titles VI and IX, which prevent 
race and sex discrimination by recipients of federal funds, may 
find justification in direct congressional authority under 
Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment even if they were 
somehow held infirm under the spending power.136 
Many of the nation’s environmental spending-power 
partnerships are also understood to be simultaneously 
grounded in another source of federal authority, usually the 
Commerce Clause. However, several Supreme Court cases 
following the New Federalism revival have challenged the 
commerce basis of some of those laws, threatening the reach of 
federal environmental law.137 Indeed, if future courts extend 
the Chief Justice’s narrowing commerce analysis of the ACA’s 
individual mandate, it could further undermine the Commerce 
 
 134. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2664–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 135. See Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The 
Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 612–62 (2013) 
(analyzing the effects of Sebelius on various forms of federal educational funding, 
including the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Act, discussing the implications for the future of conditional spending 
in federal education law). 
 136. See EMILY J. MARTIN, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POLICY, 
TITLE IX AND THE NEW SPENDING CLAUSE (Issue Brief) (2012), http://www.acslaw. 
org/sites/default/files/Martin_-_Title_IX_and_the_New_Spending_Clause_1.pdf 
(discussing independent sources of federal authority for these programs). 
 137. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 786 (2006); Solid Waste 
Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 
(2001) (environmental federalism cases challenging the reach of the Clean Water 
Act over intrastate wetlands on both statutory and constitutional grounds). 
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Clause foundations of some environmental laws. For this 
reason, it is worth analyzing their spending-power foundations 
in light of the new Sebelius doctrine, and how they would fare 
if challenged. 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER SEBELIUS 
This Part considers the post-Sebelius vulnerability of the 
nation’s major environmental laws that involve programs of 
cooperative federalism. After reviewing efforts by the literature 
to make sense of the Sebelius limit, I test the new doctrine by 
applying it to a diverse collection of environmental federalism 
partnerships: the Clean Air and Water Acts; the Coastal Zone 
Management Act; the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act; the Endangered 
Species Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; the 




Major Environmental Programs  
of Cooperative Federalism 
 
 Clean Air Act (CAA) 
 Clean Water Act (CWA) 
 Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) 
 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, & 
Liability Act (CERCLA or “Superfund”) 
 Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA) 
 Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) 
 
 
The analysis identifies those statutes that do not implicate 
the Sebelius doctrine, those that implicate only its first and 
second elements, and finally, the one statute that potentially 
implicates all three: the Clean Air Act’s crossover conditioning 
of federal highway funds. The second half of Part III focuses 
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specifically on the Clean Air Act’s highway fund sanctions, 
evaluating the vulnerabilities of the program but concluding 
that it should nevertheless survive Sebelius scrutiny. 
Demonstrating how the elements of the doctrine engage with 
the various features of different state-federal partnerships 
provides insight not only into environmental law after Sebelius, 
but also the likely impacts of the new spending-power limit on 
other areas of law. 
Yet as foreshadowed above, the most difficult part of the 
analysis is figuring out exactly how to test that limit. 
Immediately after the decision came down in 2012, 
commentators began struggling to ascertain the impacts of 
Sebelius on existing spending-power partnerships.138 Spending 
deals tying federal funds to wholly unrelated policy goals have 
long been constitutionally infirm,139 but after Sebelius, 
indirectly related conditions may also be vulnerable when the 
funds at issue are large enough to undermine genuine state 
consent. Future courts will have to divine when the size of 
federal grants between Dole’s permissible and Sebelius’s 
impermissible baselines trigger scrutiny.140 But as a threshold 
matter, when is an indirectly related condition sufficiently 
remote to constitute an “independent” program? 
A common theme in the literature is the lack of a coherent 
test. In analyzing the impacts of the new doctrine on the Title 
IX federal education spending partnership, Emily Martin of the 
National Women’s Law Center concludes that the Court 
articulated no clear test and accordingly analyzes the 
vulnerability of Title IX by distinguishing it point by point from 
Medicaid.141 Writing for the Congressional Research Service, 
Kenneth Thomas observes that the test is unclear, but that the 
limit appears to hinge on whether the states had adequate 
notice of a change in conditional funding, the relatedness of the 
change to the conditioned funds, and the size of the funds.142 
 
 138. See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. 
 139. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
 140. As discussed supra at notes 116–17 and accompanying text, grants larger 
than the $233 billion at stake under pre-ACA Medicaid are likely to be 
scrutinized, while those smaller than the $614 million/$1.2 billion in highway 
funds at issue in Dole are not. See also the figure following text at supra note 124. 
 141. See generally Martin, supra note 136. Emily Martin is General Counsel 
for the National Women’s Law Center. 
 142. See generally KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42367, THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL GRANT CONDITIONS AFTER NATIONAL 
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Professor Sam Bagenstos identifies similar elements and 
makes sense of the Sebelius limit as an “anti-leveraging 
principle,” prohibiting the use of the spending power to 
leverage a state’s substantial reliance on one spending-power 
program to coerce agreement to another.143 He defends the 
anti-leveraging principle as justifiable in theory, but 
acknowledges that the decision fails to identify a workable 
threshold for the “independent program” element.144 
However, all analyses converge on the three main elements 
in the Sebelius doctrine identified in Part II, and Professor 
Bagenstos convincingly shows that all of them must be 
manifest before the coercion limit is triggered, according to the 
logic of the Chief Justice’s analysis and where it departs from 
the conservative dissent.145 The scholarly consensus thus 
appears to be that in order to violate the presumptive 
constraint, the following three elements must be present: First, 
the new offer must unfairly surprise the state by changing the 
terms of participation in an entrenched spending-power 
partnership in which that state has established reasonable 
reliance interests. Second, the size of the grant at issue must 
be so large and forgoing it so economically infeasible to the 
state that its consent to the new offer is effectively involuntary. 
Third, the new offer must condition funds for the existing 
program on compliance with independent obligations that are 
not directly related to the disbursement of the funds within the 
original program (a crossover condition).146 
 
 
The Elements of Sebelius Analysis 
 
0. Congress uses spending power to engage states 
1. Entrenched spending partnership creates state reliance 
2. Grant at issue so big, loss would affect coercion 
3. ‘Crossover’ condition ties existing $ to independent term 
 
 
Applying these criteria to the state-federal partnerships in 
 
FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESSES V. SEBELIUS (2012). 
 143. Bagenstos, supra note 87, at 866. 
 144. Id. at 898–99, 905–06. 
 145. Id. at 870–71. 
 146. Id. 
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the nation’s environmental laws should provide comfort to 
advocates for federal environmental regulation and 
disappointment to opponents. Many federal environmental laws 
include ongoing spending-power partnerships, but few appear 
vulnerable on any of the three criteria. Several authorize 
modest grants in one-time spending deals, but not in the kind 
of ongoing, multiple-iteration way that could create reasonable 
reliance interests on the part of a state. A few include annual 
renewals that could create unfair surprise if the terms were 
suddenly altered, but none involve grants on the scale of 
Medicaid, and only one—the Clean Air Act—includes a 
potentially vulnerable crossover provision conditioning funds 
for one purpose on state assent to indirectly related terms. 
The following provides presumptive Sebelius analyses for 
the major federal environmental laws with programs of 
cooperative federalism, ordered from the least to most 
vulnerable. To summarize the ten independent analyses that 
follow: 
The Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know 
Act does not rely on the spending power and thus does not 
implicate Sebelius. Neither does the Clean Water Act’s 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 
although other parts of the Clean Water Act, discussed below, 
come closer. Four other statutes involve discrete spending-
power partnerships: the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act; the Endangered Species Act; 
and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act—but in 
each of these, the relevant federal funds are offered as one-time 
grants responding to specific tasks. By definition, these 
programs cannot create state expectations triggering even the 
first of Sebelius’s three elements. 
Of all federal environmental laws, only four include 
recurring grant programs that meaningfully trigger Sebelius’s 
first element, only two of these potentially trigger the second 
element, and only one potentially triggers all three. The 
Coastal Zone Management Act includes a program of recurring 
grants to states, but these grants are comparatively tiny. The 
Clean Water Act’s State Revolving Fund creates an ongoing 
spending partnership with more heft than the Coastal Zone 
Management Act, but the grants at issue still fall shy of the 
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available benchmarks for coercive size.147 The Safe Drinking 
Water Act involves grants potentially large enough to warrant 
scrutiny for size as well as reliance, but these grants are 
directly conditioned. Only the Clean Air Act—which links a 
state’s satisfaction of air-quality requirements to its receipt of 
substantial federal highway funds—potentially includes all 
three indicators: an ongoing spending partnership involving 
large grants with a vulnerable crossover term. 
 
 
Two Views of Environmental Federalism After Sebelius 
 
1. Sebelius Applied to Environmental Federalism 
 
 Sebelius Not Implicated: No Spending Partnership (SP) 
o EPCRA 
o CWA NPDES Program 





 Sebelius Element 1: Ongoing SPs with Small Grant 
o CZMA Administrative Grants 
o CWA State Revolving Fund ($164–238M < $614M) 
 Elements 1 & 2: Ongoing SPs with Large Grant 
o SDWA State Revolving Loan Fund ($1.4B) 
o CAA SIP Sanctions ($62B) 
 Elements 1, 2, & 3: Ongoing, Large Grant, & Crossover 




 147. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice 
Roberts’s determination that the $614 million in highway grants at issue in Dole 
were too small to act coercively but the $233 billion Medicaid grants at issue in 
Sebelius were coercive in size). 
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2. Environmental Federalism as Sebelius Typology 
 










CWA NPDES Program    
Sebelius doctrine not 
implicated  
Spending Partnership 



















implicated and first 
element triggered, 




Partnership with Large 
Recurring Grants 
SDWA State Revolving 
Loan Fund ($1.4 
billion) 
 
CAA SIP Sanctions 
($62 billion) 
Sebelius doctrine 
implicated, first and 
second elements 





Partnership with Large 
Grants & Crossover 
Condition 
CAA SIP Sanctions & 
Highway Funds 
Sebelius doctrine 





The following Sections walk through application of the 
Sebelius doctrine to each law, demonstrating the independent 
operation of the three different elements of the doctrine. The 
analysis concludes that all will ultimately pass constitutional 
muster. 
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A. Non-Spending Power Programs of Environmental 
Federalism: Sebelius Is Not Implicated 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA). EPCRA engages state and local actors in coordinated 
planning for chemical emergencies, provides for notification of 
emergency releases of chemicals, and addresses communities’ 
rights to know about toxic and hazardous chemicals.148 The Act 
establishes State Emergency Response Commissions, drawing 
technical expertise in the field of emergency response from 
various state agencies.149 It further authorizes the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to order any facility 
owner or operator to comply with emergency planning 
provisions.150 However, as EPCRA partnerships are not 
premised on any spending-power bargaining, they do not 
implicate the Sebelius doctrine.151 
Clean Water Act National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES). The Clean Water Act,152 which regulates 
point-source pollutants to the nation’s waters,153 provides 
another example of a significant program of environmental 
federalism that operates independently of the spending power. 
 
 148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2012). 
 149. See id. §§ 11001(a), 11045; see also State Emergency Response 
Commissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region4/air/epcra/ 
sercs.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2014) (listing commissioners). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001(a), 11045 (2013). 
 151. EPCRA is likely premised on the Commerce Clause and other sources of 
federal authority to assist states with emergency response, although this has yet 
to be confirmed in any official congressional or judicial statement. The House of 
Representatives now requires that new bills specify the applicable source of 
constitutional authority, but EPCRA was passed prior to the enactment of this 
House Rule in 2010. See CLERK OF THE H.R., 113TH CONG., RULES OF THE H.R. r. 
XII, cl. 7(c)(1) (2013) (providing that sponsors must submit a statement citing “as 
specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the 
Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution” to be published in the 
Congressional Record). 
 152. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251–1387 (2013)). 
 153. A “point source” discharge, which enters a regulated watercourse through 
the end of a pipe, must be permitted under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System. 33 U.S.C. § 1342; see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 
715, 787,126 S. Ct. 2208, 2252 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Solid Waste 
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001) (confirming the 
basis of federal authority for the Clean Water Act in the Commerce Clause). 
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State and federal actors cooperate in enforcing the Clean Water 
Act’s pollution permitting program through shared supervision 
of the NPDES program, which prohibits the discharge of 
pollutants into protected water bodies without a permit.154 The 
law allows the EPA either to act as the permitting authority or 
to delegate permitting authority to willing states.155 All but a 
handful of states have chosen to self-administer the program 
even without offsetting federal funding, because they prefer the 
greater autonomy it allows them in managing in-state water 
resources and economic development.156 As the arrangement is 
not premised on the exchange of federal money, it too is 
invulnerable to a Sebelius challenge. (Other CWA programs 
that do involve the spending power are discussed below.) 
B. Spending Partnerships with One-Time Grants: 
Implicates Doctrine but Does Not Trigger First 
Threshold Element 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA, the “Superfund” act, 
imposes liability for the use, harboring, or transportation of 
hazardous substances that substantially endanger human 
health or the environment.157 The program enables Congress to 
allocate discretionary § 104(k) “Superfund” grants to encourage 
state participation and leadership in cleanup efforts.158 States 
and tribes are also eligible for § 128(a) Brownfield Grants to 
cope with less-contaminated sites.159 However, like those at 
issue in RCRA, none of these grants could reasonably be 
 
 154. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2013). 
 155. Id. § 1342(a). 
 156. E.g., N.M. ENV’T DEP’T, NPDES STATE PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION 
BRIEFING PAPER (2004), http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/swqb/PSRS/NPDES-
DelegationBriefingPaper_June-04.pdf (discussing the benefits of self-
administration). 
 157. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), amended by Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 
(codified as amended throughout 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2013). 
 158. See id. § 9604. 
 159. Id. §§ 9604(k) (discussing brownfields revitalization funding), 
9628(a)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that States and tribes may use grants to capitalize a 
revolving loan fund for brownfield remediation). Section 128(a) was added to 
CERCLA in 2002 by the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act. Pub. L. No. 107-118, § 128(a), 115 Stat. 2356, 2376–2377 
(2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (2013)). 
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construed as ongoing in a way that would create Sebelius-
worthy reliance interests.160 Congress makes Superfund grants 
to the states for the limited purpose of cleaning up toxic 
Superfund sites. Once the site has been remediated, the 
receiving state would not ordinarily expect ongoing federal 
funding under this program. 
Endangered Species Act (ESA). The ESA provides for the 
conservation of endangered and threatened species of fish, 
plants, and other wildlife.161 Section Six authorizes grants to 
states through the Cooperative Endangered Species 
Conservation Fund, Habitat Conservation Planning Assistance 
Grants, and Habitat Conservation Plan Land Acquisition 
Grants.162 However, ESA spending partnerships are very 
limited in size and scope.163 Like RCRA and CERCLA funds, 
the ESA’s one-time grants do not trigger the doctrine’s first 
element of an ongoing partnership. 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). RCRA is 
a cooperative-federalism program regulating hazardous 
 
 160. CERCLA is also firmly authorized under both the Commerce and Tax 
powers, potentially providing additional constitutional support for Congressional 
regulation involving state participants. For cases indicating CERCLA’s firm 
footing in the commerce power, see Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 
176 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 
1997). The Superfund itself is supported by a tax on the petrochemical industry, 
utilities, and crude oil importers, and through reimbursement from responsible 
parties, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9611–12, 9631–33, 9661–62, 9671–72 (1995), suggesting that 
CERCLA is also authorized independently by the same tax power under which 
Sebelius upheld the ACA. See Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive 
Source of Environmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 149 at n.18 
(2001) (discussing the use of the Tax power in the Superfund program). 
 161. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§1531–1544 (2012)). The ESA was enacted 
pursuant to Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 
214 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 162. Section 6 of the Endangered Species Act, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. 
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/grants/S6_grants.html. 
 163. Traditional Section Six Conservation Grants provide financial assistance 
to state activities preserving listed species, including habitat restoration, species 
status surveys, public education, and outreach, captive propagation and 
reintroduction, nesting surveys, genetic studies, and development of management 
plans. Id. In 2008, all such grants made to the Midwestern states were for less 
than $50,000 per year, and the majority fell within the $10,000 to $20,000 federal 
contribution range. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Midwest Region, Traditional 
Section Six Grants Made to States in 2008, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/ 
endangered/grants/2008/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (providing links to 
grant information for Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin). 
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substances through “cradle to grave” oversight.164 The statute 
enables states to choose whether to become authorized to 
implement the program within their boundaries or submit to 
federal regulation.165 The statute originally provided funding 
mechanisms to assist states developing and implementing new 
regulatory programs, and these funds have been sporadically 
reauthorized by Congress, but none involve recurring grants 
that could create state expectations implicating Sebelius’s first 
element. Once a state successfully implements the new 
program, it could have no reasonable expectations for grant 
renewals that could trigger further scrutiny under Sebelius. 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). 
SMCRA prevents water pollution, soil erosion, ecological 
destruction, and social and economic disruption as a result of 
surface mining.166 States may implement their own regulatory 
programs or submit to federal regulation.167 The Act further 
authorizes cooperative agreements with states to enable state 
regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations 
on federal lands within the state.168 The Act provides for 
discretionary grants to assist states in developing, 
administering and enforcing state programs, but grants cease 
after a state becomes fully certified to regulate.169 Because 
grants are designed to end after a temporary start-up period, 
states cannot form reasonable expectations of a long-term 
funding partnership that could implicate Sebelius.170 
 
 164. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 
Stat. 2795 (codified as part of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–
6992 (2013)). See also 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (explicitly noting that improper 
disposal of hazardous substances affects interstate commerce). 
 165. EPA, Authorizing States to Implement RCRA, in RCRA ORIENTATION 
MANUAL 2011, at III-133, III-134 (2011), www.epa.gov/osw/inforesources/ 
pubs/orientat/rom311.pdf (“As of August 2008, all states, with the exception of 
Alaska and Iowa, are authorized to implement the RCRA hazardous waste 
program.”). 
 166. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-87, 91 
Stat. 445 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (2013)). 
 167. See id. §§ 1253, 1254 (describing the state and federal programs for 
regulating surface coal mining and reclamation operations). 
 168. Id. § 1273. 
 169. Id. § 1295; OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION & ENFORCEMENT, 
Regulatory Programs Overview, in FEDERAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL (2010), 
http://www.osmre.gov/lrg/fam/5-100.pdf; Basics of SMCRA Title IV, W. PA. COAL. 
FOR ABANDONED MINE RECLAMATION (May 2007), http://www.wpcamr.org/ 
projects/smcra_reauth/TitleIV%20Basics.pdf. 
 170. SMCRA is also authorized under the Commerce Clause, as recognized in 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface 
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C. Spending Partnerships with Small Recurring Grants: 
Triggers First Element Only 
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). The CZMA is a 
voluntary program of cooperative federalism fully structured as 
a spending-power partnership, designed to protect coastal 
resources from interregional development pressure.171 The 
CZMA offers four different kinds of federal funding to 
encourage states to create coastal management plans: § 306 
administrative grants, § 309 enhancement grants, § 6217 
nonpoint pollution control grants, and § 315 estuarine research 
reserve grants.172 
Administrative grants are ongoing grants,173 potentially 
implicating the first element of Sebelius. But as they typically 
fall far shy of even the Dole threshold of size-related safety, 
they are unlikely to reach the threshold of coercive size. In 
fiscal year 2012, a mere $65.9 million was allocated toward all 
coastal management programs.174 This figure encompasses 
more than just the recurring administrative grants, but even if 
all of such funding were to trigger Sebelius scrutiny (and even 
unadjusted for inflation), it still amounts to a small fraction of 
the $614 million Dole threshold, which tops $1 billion in today’s 
dollars.175 
Clean Water Act State Revolving Fund. The Clean Water 
Act, the comprehensive water-quality statute that includes the 
NPDES permitting program discussed previously,176 also 
includes various provisions authorizing federal grants to 
 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981)). 
 171. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 
(1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2013)). The CZMA was 
enacted pursuant to Congress’s commerce power. See Winter v. Natural Resources 
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 18 (2008) (discussing the president’s authority to 
grant exemptions from the CZMA, and quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B)). 
 172. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455 (administrative grants), 1456b (enhancement grants), 
1455b (nonpoint pollution control grants), 1456-1 (estuarine research reserve 
grants). 
 173. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (grants are available to coastal states for the purpose of 
administering a qualifying management program). 
 174.  This figure includes not only the administrative grants but also 
enhancement and coastal nonpoint pollution control program grants. FY 2012 
OCRM Budget Allocations by Program, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: NAT’L OCEANIC 
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Jan. 30, 2013), http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/ 
funding/welcome.html. 
 175. See supra note 125 and accompanying graph. 
 176. See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. 
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states.177 The most significant for purposes of Sebelius scrutiny 
are those made under the State Revolving Fund (SRF) for the 
purpose of distributing low-interest loans to cities and towns 
for infrastructure and water-quality projects.178 Established in 
the Water Quality Act of 1987, the CWA SRF provides states 
with annual capitalization grants to fund municipal projects for 
wastewater treatment (§ 212), nonpoint source pollution 
control (§ 319), and watershed and estuary management (§ 
320).179 
Grants are awarded to states to develop conservation 
plans, implement management programs, and to issue loans to 
local communities to construct treatment works.180 Twenty-
seven states have implemented programs that leverage these 
funds by issuing bonds secured by SRF assets, increasing the 
value of the federal grants to finance more projects over 
time.181 Since 1987, cumulative assistance under the SRF has 
surpassed $69 billion.182 In the last decade, annual federal 
spending in the program has ranged from a high of $238.5 
million in 2003 to a low of $155.9 million in 2013.183 
 
 177. The CWA includes fourteen categorical grant programs to states, 
including those to provide water pollution control program support, public water 
system supervision, underground water source protection, beach monitoring, and 
nonpoint source pollution control. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER 
PROGRAM GUIDANCE FISCAL YEAR 2011, 49–50 (Apr. 2010), http://nepis.epa. 
gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100E5WU.pdf. 
 178. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1381 (2013). 
 179. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1382 (annual capitalization grants funding municipal 
projects for wastewater treatment), 1329 (nonpoint source pollution control), 1330 
(watershed and estuary management). 
 180. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1381 (discussing capitalization grants to the states 
to develop and implement conservation and management plans), 1382 (water 
pollution control revolving fund), 1383 (water pollution control revolving loan 
funds). 
 181. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT: CLEAN WATER STATE 
REVOLVING FUND PROGRAMS 11 (2007), http://water.epa.gov/grants_funding/ 
cwsrf/upload/2008_07_29_cwfinance_cwsrf_2007-annual-report.pdf (noting that 
“27 states have chosen to implement leveraging approaches by issuing revenue 
and general obligation bonds that are secured by CWSRF assets,” and that 
“[t]hrough leveraging, states have increased their capacity to finance important 
water quality projects by $20.6 billion”). 
 182. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT: CLEAN WATER STATE 
REVOLVING FUND PROGRAMS 2 (2008), http://water.epa.gov/grants_funding/cwsrf/ 
upload/2009_05_05_cwfinance_cwsrf_cwsrf_ar2008_final.pdf (noting that from its 
initiation in 1987 until 2008, “the CWSRF has provided $69 billion in cumulative 
assistance for wastewater infrastructure, nonpoint source, and estuary projects”). 
 183. Clean Water Act Section 319(h) Grant Funds History, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/319hhistory.cfm (last updated Oct. 9, 
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CWA State Revolving Fund grants are substantially larger 
than CZMA administrative grants. The fact that grants are 
made on a recurring basis clearly triggers the first “reliance” 
element of Sebelius. However, even the largest of these grants 
would survive scrutiny under the remaining elements, because 
they are still much smaller than the Dole standard of size-
related safety—whether compared in absolute terms or as a 
percentage of overall state spending. The SRF 2003 figure of 
$238 million is far smaller than the absolute value of the Dole 
figure, especially when adjusted for inflation.184 It also 
constitutes less than 0.1 percent of total state expenditures for 
the fiscal year,185 half the parallel Dole threshold of 0.19 
percent of total state expenditures in 1987.186 
Moreover (and foreshadowing the subsequent stages of 
analysis), both the CZMA and SRF grants would survive 
scrutiny even if they exceeded the size threshold, because the 
federal conditions that attach to these funds are directly 
related to the use of the funds. States are entitled to use these 
funds only for qualifying coastal management and water-
quality projects, respectively. Because there are no conditions 
tying the availability of these funds to a state’s agreement to 
indirectly related conditions, the critical third element of a 
crossover condition also is missing from both spending-power 
partnerships. 
 
2012) (table listing total grants for each year since 1990). 
 184. Dole’s $614 million in 1987 dollars would amount to $1.2 billion inflation-
adjusted dollars in 2012. See, e.g., US Inflation Calculator, COINNEWS MEDIA 
GROUP, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (based on the consumer price index) 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 185. According to the National Association of State Budget Officers, total state 
expenditures for 2003 totaled $326 billion. 2003 NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET 
OFFICERS STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 6, http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/ 
files/ER_2003.pdf. The 2003 SRF figure of $238 million is 0.07 percent of total 
state expenditures for that year. A perfect comparison to the Dole benchmark 
would require calculating a specific state’s SRF grant in proportion to its specific 
budget, and figures could vary from this approximation. However, the 0.07 
percent figure leaves a large margin for variation without exceeding the Dole 
threshold. 
 186. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–05 (2012) 
and supra text accompanying note 116 (explaining the Dole thresholds). 
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D. Spending Partnerships with Large Recurring Grants: 
Triggers First and Second Elements 
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). The SDWA ensures the 
quality of drinking water by authorizing the promulgation of 
federal standards and federal oversight of the state agencies, 
local governments, and water suppliers that implement these 
standards.187 The SDWA also authorizes the Drinking Water 
State Revolving Loan Fund (DWSRLF), an ongoing grant 
program similar to the CWA SRF that helps public water 
agencies finance the infrastructure projects needed to comply 
with federal drinking water regulations.188 Similar to the CWA 
SRF, DWSRLF annual capitalization grants enable 
participating states to capitalize their own state loan funds, 
providing a long-term source of financing for the costs of 
maintaining drinking water infrastructure and quality.189 
The DWSRLF provides long-term federal financing of state 
infrastructure through annual grants, and like the CWA SRF, 
it represents an entrenched spending partnership likely to 
trigger the Sebelius reliance element.190 But in contrast to 
CWA funds, federal DWSRLF funding may have exceeded the 
clear safety zone for coercive size established in Dole.191 The 
original statute authorized appropriations through only 2003, 
providing for $599 million in 1994 and $1 billion for each of the 
fiscal years between 1995 and 2003.192 Total funds made 
 
 187. Safe Drinking Water Act § 1443, 42 U.S.C. § 300f. The Safe Drinking 
Water Act is premised on the Commerce Clause. See Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 
995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Commerce Clause provides the constitutional 
authority for the [Safe Drinking Water] Act.”). 
 188. Pub. L. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (1996) (codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f-j 
(2013)). The SDWA also includes a few other recurring grant programs to states 
and tribes, including State Public Water System Supervision Grants and State 
Underground Water Source Protection Grants, but their size puts them well below 
the Dole threshold of concern. See Grants – UIC, U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/Grants.cfm (last updated Oct. 17, 
2013). 
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-12 (2013). 
 190. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2636–39 and supra text accompanying note 93 
(explaining the Sebelius reliance element). 
 191. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-12(m) (2013); see also Procedures for Implementing 
Certain Provisions of EPA’s Fiscal Year 2012 Appropriations Affecting the Clean 
Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Fund Programs, available at 
http://water.epa.gov/grants_funding/cwsrf/upload/FY-2012-SRF-Procedures-and-
Attachments.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 192. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-12(m) (2013). The Fiscal Year 2012 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act sets forth implementing requirements and administration 
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available to the states in 2010 approached $1.4 billion193—still 
far short of Medicaid’s coercive $233 billion, but now in the 
gray zone between that $233 billion and the $614 million/$1.2 
billion held acceptable in Dole.194 
The DWSRLF’s $1.4 billion dollars in 2010 would have 
amounted to $729 million in Dole’s 1987 inflation-adjusted 
dollars, exceeding the Dole threshold of safety in absolute 
terms.195 However, as a percentage of overall state spending, 
2010 DWSRLF spending still constitutes less than 0.1 percent 
of total state expenditures,196 lower than the parallel Dole 
figure of 0.5 percent of South Dakota’s total budget. Of course, 
a perfect comparison to the Dole benchmark would require 
calculating a specific state’s grant in proportion to its specific 
budget, and figures could vary from this approximation. A state 
with a small overall budget but a large DWSRLF grant might 
see this percentage exceed 0.5 percent. Either way, we are now 
operating in the zone of size-related uncertainty left open after 
Sebelius. 
The SDWA thus potentially triggers two of the three 
Sebelius indicators: it includes an entrenched grant program 
creating reliance interests by the states, and its grants might 
exceed the threshold for coercive size, at least if a court were to 
interpret that limit conservatively. Nonetheless, the program 
would still survive scrutiny because it lacks the third 
indicator—a crossover condition. Like the CZMA and CWA 
SRF, all funds are conditioned directly on their use within the 
program.197 
 
priorities for both the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act State 
Revolving Fund Programs, and it keeps the DWSRLF program current by 
authorizing additional appropriations. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 1016–19 (2011). 
 193. Final State Allotment of Drinking Water State Revolving Fund 
Appropriation for Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa. 
gov/grants_funding/dwsrf/allotments/Final-State-Allotment-of-Drinking-Water-
State-Revolving-Fund-Appropriation-for-Fiscal-Year-2010.cfm. 
 194. See supra note 125 and accompanying graph. 
 195. See, e.g., U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, COINNEWS MEDIA GROUP LLC, 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (based on the consumer price index) (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
 196. See NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 7 (reporting that total 
state expenditures in 2010 were $1.6 trillion). The 2010 DWSRLF figure of $1.4 
billion is 0.09 percent of the $1.6 trillion of total state expenditures for the year. 
 197. The SDWA includes other ongoing grant programs to states and tribes 
with primary enforcement for federal programs authorized under the Act, 
including State Public Water System Supervision Grants and State Underground 
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E. Spending Partnerships with Large Recurring Grants 
and Crossover Conditions: Triggers All Three Elements 
Clean Air Act (CAA). Among all environmental laws, only 
the CAA approaches the potentially combustible mix of all 
three Sebelius indicators. The CAA is designed to protect and 
improve air quality and the stratospheric ozone layer.198 Under 
the CAA, states must prepare and maintain an adequate State 
Implementation Plan (SIP) for attaining federally designated 
air-quality standards, and they must remain in attainment or 
risk the sanction of losing certain federal highway funds.199 
Federal highway funds are among the largest federal grants to 
states,200 and they represent an ongoing spending-power 
partnership on which states had long relied before they were 
linked to the CAA. Because the CAA conditions the receipt of 
federal highway funds on a state’s performance of CAA duties 
that are only indirectly related to those highway funds, it 
comes closer than any other environmental law to the 
vulnerable crossover condition at the heart of the Sebelius 
doctrine. 
CAA § 179 requires that federal highway funds be 
withheld from a state that has failed to prepare an adequate 
SIP or failed to implement requirements under an approved 
plan when that state includes “non-attainment areas.”201 Non-
attainment areas are those that have not achieved the CAA’s 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, which define the 
level of air quality necessary to protect the public health and 
welfare.202 The EPA maintains initial discretion about how and 
 
Water Source Protection Grants, but their size puts them well below the Dole 
threshold of concern. See Grants – UIC, U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, http://water. 
epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/Grants.cfm (last updated Oct. 17, 2013). 
 198. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7626) (2013). The CAA is authorized by the Commerce Clause. 
See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 199. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7509(b)(1) (2013). 
 200. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
 201. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7509, § 7509(b)(1)(A) (2013). (“The Administrator may 
impose a prohibition, applicable to a nonattainment area, on the approval by the 
Secretary of Transportation of any projects or the awarding by the Secretary of 
any grants, under title 23. . .”). EPA may also apply discretionary sanctions after 
determining that a CAA requirement has been violated. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(m); 
see also EPA Regulations on Sanctions, 40 C.F.R. § 52.30–52.32; Clean Air Act 
Sanctions, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/air_ 
quality/highway_sanctions/#subject (last updated Nov. 6, 2013). 
 202. E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7511(a) (ozone), 7512 (carbon monoxide), 7513 
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when to apply sanctions after notice and a grace period, but the 
Act mandates withholding of funds if noncompliance continues 
beyond eighteen and twenty-four months.203 The EPA is then 
obligated to prevent disbursement of federal highway funds—
but only those pertaining to the area in non-attainment, and 
even then, the penalty excludes funds used to reduce air 
pollution emissions, funds that are necessary for traffic 
safety,204 and funds for certain specified transportation 
projects.205 The EPA also retains discretion to apply leniency 
for states that have made good-faith efforts to comply.206 
An important detail mitigating SIP requirements and 
penalties is the availability of a federal alternative. A state 
may effectively opt out of the responsibility to prepare a SIP 
and effectively elect a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP), 
which shifts planning and implementation responsibilities to 
the EPA.207 If a state declines to create a SIP, or if the EPA 
concludes that a submitted SIP fails to meet statutory criteria, 
the EPA is required to create a FIP for that state within two 
years.208 The state is then alleviated of its obligation to prepare 
a SIP and the potential for further sanctions under § 179 is 
negated.209 Nevertheless, most states prefer the autonomy of 
managing their own plans, and the EPA has reportedly used its 
potential authority to withhold transportation funds as a 
threat to encourage full CAA compliance.210 
In contrast to all other environmental laws, then, the CAA 
 
(particulate matter), and 7514 (nitrogen dioxide). 
 203. Id. § 7509(a)(4) (“If the Administrator has selected one of such sanctions 
and the deficiency has not been corrected within 6 months thereafter, sanctions 
under both paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of subsection (b) shall apply until the 
Administrator determines that the State has come into compliance.”). 
 204. Id. § 7509(b)(1) (exempting “projects or grants for safety where the 
Secretary determines, based on accident or other appropriate data submitted by 
the State, that the principal purpose of the project is an improvement in safety to 
resolve a demonstrated safety problem and likely will result in a significant 
reduction in, or avoidance of, accidents”). 
 205. Id. § 7509(b)(1)(B). 
 206. Id. § 7509(a). 
 207. Id. § 7410(c)(1). 
 208. See id. 
 209. Section 179 is ambiguous on this point, but the EPA has formalized this 
interpretation in the implementing regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 93.120 (2013), to 
which a reviewing court must defer. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 210. See generally JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30131, 
HIGHWAY FUND SANCTIONS AND CONFORMITY UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (OCT. 
1999), available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/transportation/trans-29.cfm. 
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courts controversy because it potentially implicates all three 
elements of the Sebelius doctrine: (1) a new condition changes 
the terms of an entrenched spending partnership, (2) the size of 
the grants at issue are potentially coercive, and (3) the new 
offer conditions those large federal funds on compliance with 
indirectly related obligations. 
Federal transportation funds constitute a substantial 
component of overall state spending, smaller only than 
Medicaid and combined federal spending on primary, 
secondary, and higher education. In 2010, states received 
around $62 billion in federal highway funds211—still short of 
Medicaid’s monster grants, but substantially larger than the 
funds at issue in Dole, whether compared in absolute terms or 
as a percentage of overall state spending. Highway funds 
comprised nearly 4 percent of overall state spending in 2010.212 
That said, nearly half that amount was designated for Highway 
Law Enforcement and Safety, and Maintenance and Highway 
Services, two safety-related programs likely exempt from CAA 
withholding.213 The total would be further lowered as other 
exempted programs were subtracted from withholding, but it 
may yet exceed Dole’s clear margin of safety. Notably, however, 
it is hard to apply real numbers in this guessing game, because 
while the EPA frequently warns states in noncompliance about 
the potential of withholding, it has only actually withheld 
highway funds on one occasion, and only for a small part of a 
state (in East Helena, Montana in 1996).214 
 
 211. David Baake, Federalism in the Air: Is the Clean Air Act’s “My Way or No 
Highway” Provision Constitutional After NFIB v. Sebelius?, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (2012) (citing figures from the Federal Highway Administration and the 
National Association of State Budget Officers). Baake notes that of the overall $62 
billion, only $33 billion was eligible for withholding, reducing the absolute value 
and percentage of overall state spending by nearly half. Id. 
 212. See NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 7 (reporting that total 
state expenditures in 2010 were $1.6 trillion). The 2010 figure of $62 billion in 
highway funds represents 3.86 percent of the $1.6 trillion in total state 
expenditures for the year. 
 213. See Baake, supra note 211, at 8 (noting that of the $62 billion in federal 
highway funds, “approximately $9 billion was spent on Highway Law 
Enforcement and Safety, and approximately $20 billion was spent on 
Maintenance and Highway Services, two spending categories probably eligible for 
the safety exemption under Section 179”). 
 214. Clean Air Act Sanctions, Status of Sanction Clocks Under the Clean Air 
Act, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/air_quality/ 
highway_sanctions/ sanctionsclock.cfm (updated by EPA, Jan. 7, 2013); see also 
JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB10004, CLEAN AIR ACT ISSUES IN 
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In addition to the large grants involved, the CAA condition 
is vulnerable because it changes the terms of an entrenched 
transportation spending partnership in a way that could 
violate the expectations of states when they first entered into 
the partnership. The Department of Transportation has been 
administering federal highway funds to the states for over fifty 
years, since the Federal-Aid Highway Act was first passed in 
1956.215 It is unlikely that states could have foreseen at the 
time that the relationship would evolve to include air-quality 
regulation. 
Most importantly, and alone among environmental laws, 
the CAA conditions existing funds dedicated to one purpose 
(highways) on a state’s compliance with a separate, indirectly 
related program (air-quality management). The conditions are 
sufficiently related to satisfy the germaneness requirements of 
Dole, because the use of state highways will contribute to that 
state’s ambient air-quality problems through automobile 
exhaust. However, not all of the pollutants compromising air 
quality are emitted by mobile sources using state highways; 
power plants, industrial and agricultural operations, and 
municipal and domestic uses also contribute. At best, there is 
an imperfect correlation between the use of the funds and the 
attached condition. 
Conditioning highway funds authorized under a 
transportation statute on a state’s compliance with air-quality 
management obligations that go beyond transportation seems 
to present the very crossover fact pattern that the Chief Justice 
warned about in Sebelius. The condition is only indirectly 
related to the federal funds at peril, and those funds are 
authorized by a separate, pre-existing federal grant program 
under a separate statute in a different part of the United 
States Code. 
F. Assessing the Vulnerability of the CAA’s Highway 
Sanctions 
Legal commentators have reached conflicting conclusions 
about potential Sebelius problems with the CAA sanctions. For 
 
THE 106TH CONGRESS (2000), available at 
http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/ern/00may/air-24.php. 
 215. Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (1956). 
RYAN_AUTHORRETURN 5/31/2014 2:28 PM 
2014] SPENDING POWER AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1053 
example, Professor Jonathan Adler suggests that the highway 
fund penalty should be stricken, noting that highway funds are 
raised from gasoline taxes and are even “less directly related to 
air pollution control (particularly from stationary sources) than 
traditional Medicaid is to the Medicaid expansion.”216 David 
Baake concludes just as certainly that the sanctions are not 
unconstitutionally coercive, because the funds at issue are 
smaller than Medicaid’s by a factor of seven, and also because 
the penalty is so much more avoidable than the one at issue in 
the ACA.217 
Professor Bagenstos reserves judgment. He concedes that 
the provision is vulnerable under the reliance and crossover 
elements of the doctrine, but agrees that the CAA and the ACA 
may be distinguishable in size and nuance.218 He defends the 
connection between highway maintenance and air-quality 
regulation, noting Congress’s “desire that highway construction 
be carried out in a manner that does not contribute to air 
pollution,”219 but emphasizes that the problem is not Dole’s 
germaneness inquiry but Sebelius’s crossover condition.220 The 
CAA subjects highway funds to a condition that is not directly 
related to their use; after all, preparing a SIP is not about 
building a highway.221 
At least one state has already experimented with the 
potential for using Sebelius in litigation against the CAA’s SIP 
requirements. On July 20, 2012, Texas state attorneys filed a 
notice of supplemental authority suggesting a Sebelius claim in 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, a pending suit 
challenging the EPA’s new requirement that states update 
their SIPs with greenhouse gas regulations.222 Under the new 
 
 216. Jonathan H. Alder, Could the Health Care Decision Hobble the Clean Air 
Act?, PERC BLOG (July 23, 2012), http://perc.org/blog/could-health-care-decision-
hobble-clean-air-act. 
 217. Baake, supra note 211. 
 218. Bagenstos, supra note 86, at 917–20 (quoting Missouri v. United States, 
918 F. Supp. 1320, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 109 F.3d 
440 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
 219. Id. at 918 (quoting Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1333). 
 220. Id. (noting that lower courts have consistently rejected germaneness 
claims and affirmed that the CAA furthers Congress’s purpose because both 
mobile and stationary sources contribute to the overall problem of air pollution). 
 221. Id. at 918–19. 
 222. Petitioner State of Texas’s Notice of Supplemental Authority, Utility Air 
Regulatory Group v. EPA, No. 11-1037 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2012), http://www. 
eenews.net/assets/2012/07/31/document_pm_03.pdf. 
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rule, states may not issue permits for the construction or 
improvement of projects that will emit large amounts of 
regulated pollutants until qualifying SIPs are approved.223 
Frustrated by the consequences of an invalid SIP during this 
time, Texas argued that the EPA should allow a buffer period 
of three years before invalidating its old SIP.224 The July 2012 
filing implied that Texas would be unconstitutionally coerced 
otherwise, although the issue was not raised during oral 
argument on May 7, 2013.225 
The court ultimately dismissed the claim and 
distinguished the facts from those at issue in Sebelius, finding 
that “the circumstance [sic] here are not comparable to 
Congress’s coercive financial threat to withhold all Medicaid 
funds from States in the [ACA] provision challenged under the 
Spending Clause in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius.”226 Though unsuccessful (and 
distinguishable from a pure highway fund challenge), Texas’s 
claim nevertheless demonstrates that states unhappy with 
CAA requirements are seeking opportunities to make use of the 
new Sebelius doctrine. 
However, Sebelius claims targeting SIP and highway fund 
sanctions must contend with a critical point that distinguishes 
the CAA crossover condition from the invalidated Medicaid 
expansion condition. In contrast to the ACA, the CAA provides 
states with the straightforward option to avoid all SIP-related 
obligations and sanctions by simply opting out of the SIP 
program and invoking the federal FIP alternative.227 After all, 
 
 223. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7477 (2013) (prohibiting construction of a “major 
emitting facility” without a permit that requires the proposed facility use “the best 
available control technology” for each pollutant subject to regulation under the 
Act, regardless of applicable SIP provisions). 
 224. Lawrence Hurley, Texas Wastes No Time in Citing Supreme Court Health 
Care Ruling in Clean Air Act Litigation, ENV’T & ENERGY PUBL’G (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/08/01/1. 
 225. D.C. Circuit Calendar, available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/ 
sixtyday.nsf/fullcalendar?OpenView&term=2013&count=1000&date=2013-06-27; 
email from Professor Richard Lazarus, Harvard Law School (June 27, 2013) 
(discussing oral arguments). 
 226. Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 227. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus, Texas Unconvincing in Clean Air Suit, ENVTL. 
FORUM, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 12, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rlazarus/ 
docs/columns/LAZARUS_FORUM_2012_SEP-OCT.pdf; Damien M. Schiff, NFIB  
v. Sebelius, Coercion, and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 
SCOTUSREPORT (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.scotusreport.com/2012/08/06/nfib-v-
sebelius-coercion-and-the-unconstitutional-conditions-doctrine/; David Baake, 
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the premise of the Sebelius doctrine is that Congress should not 
be able to coerce the states, and enabling the states to opt out 
without losing the funds at issue is the antithesis of Sebelius 
coercion. 
Consider how the facts of a pure SIP highway fund 
challenge would differ from those at issue in Sebelius. States 
that opted out of their role in administering the Medicaid 
expansion stood to lose all of their existing Medicaid funding, 
facing an all-or-nothing dilemma regarding participation in 
both federal programs. Their choices were to either accept the 
new expansion, or lose all federal funding under the existing 
program. By contrast, the CAA enables states to avoid SIP 
obligations without sacrificing the existing highway fund 
partnership by opting for the EPA to directly regulate in-state 
polluters through a FIP.228 In that case, the EPA becomes the 
author and implementer of plans to regulate pollution in the 
state, and sanctions against a state for noncompliance 
disappear.229 
The fact that most states prefer the autonomy conferred by 
the SIP option over direct EPA regulation under the FIP 
alternative is irrelevant to the Sebelius coercion inquiry. The 
point is that states relying on recurring highway grants may 
continue to receive them independently from any SIP 
obligations by opting out of the SIP program entirely. If states 
decide that they prefer the regulatory control that a SIP offers 
over a FIP, that represents a freely bargained-for position that 
does not implicate Sebelius coercion. 
Even if the FIP alternative were not available to forestall 
the highway fund penalty, CAA sanctions are distinguishable 
from the troubled Medicaid penalty on several other grounds. 
Most important, federal funding plays a much smaller role in 
state transportation regulation than it does in state Medicaid 
implementation.230 For example, in 2010, federal funding 
comprised 42 percent of all state expenditures on Medicaid, but 
 
Federalism in the Air: Is the Clean Air Act’s “My Way or No Highway” Provision 




 228. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See supra notes 116, 212 and accompanying text. 
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only 7.3 percent of all state transportation funding.231 A court 
reviewing a Sebelius challenge to the highway fund sanctions 
could easily conclude that the funds at issue are so much 
smaller in size and impact than Medicaid funding that the CAA 
sanctions are just too small to meet the size-related coercion 
factor. That said, the vagueness of the size constraint means 
that a court could also find it violated here, highlighting the 
wide zone of uncertainty that the Chief Justice left open 
between Dole and Sebelius. 
As noted, however, the CAA provides the EPA with a 
variety of ways to forestall or lighten the penalty in comparison 
to the all-or-nothing approach of the ACA’s Medicaid penalty, 
rendering the overall force of the penalty less “coercive” in 
impact. The vulnerable federal highway grants are much more 
narrowly tailored than those at issue in Sebelius, exempting 
essential highway funds devoted to road-safety and other 
protected projects. The EPA also retains much greater 
discretion on when and how to apply them. Unless an entire 
state is out of compliance (which would be unprecedented), 
highway funds may be withheld proportionately, corresponding 
only to the portion of the state in non-attainment.232 The 
administrator also retains discretion not to apply the penalty if 
the state is making good-faith efforts to comply,233 an option 
that the Court apparently considered unavailable to Secretary 
Sebelius regarding Medicaid sanctions. 
Finally, to the extent Sebelius was decided to protect 
legitimate state expectations in spending-power bargaining, 
the reliance interests at stake are much different in the CAA 
context. Participating states have consented to the CAA’s 
crossover terms for decades, in contrast with the open rebellion 
that took place in the wake of the ACA’s passage. If any state 
reliance interests were upset by unfair surprise when the 
sanctions first emerged, that upset may have become mooted 
by subsequent state expectations generated through years of 
experience under the existing program. If the program were 
 
 231. NASBO FY 2010 Report, supra note 118, at 9–10 (describing sources of 
state funds by expenditure category and federal fund expenditures). 
 232. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(A) (2013) (“Administrator may impose a 
prohibition, applicable to a nonattainment area, on the approval by the Secretary 
of Transportation of any projects or the awarding by the Secretary of any grants.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 233. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7509(a) (2013). 
RYAN_AUTHORRETURN 5/31/2014 2:28 PM 
2014] SPENDING POWER AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1057 
later amended in some meaningful way, however, this defense 
could be weakened. 
With all this in mind, a successful facial challenge seems 
extremely unlikely, because it is difficult to imagine the law 
proving coercive in every possible application.234 The worst 
case scenario for the CAA is more likely that an individual 
state could succeed on a more limited, as-applied challenge if 
the federal alternative is somehow disregarded and none of 
EPA’s ample discretion is deployed in that state’s favor.235 That 
would leave the overall statutory program intact, providing 
relief only to the state demonstrating coercion in a particular 
instance. 
Of course, even the threat of a successful as-applied 
challenge may be enough to prompt the EPA to enforce 
sanctions more mildly, which in turn could weaken the rigor 
with which states comply. In this way, Sebelius could 
meaningfully impact the way the CAA functions, even if it does 
not undo the current terms of the statute. Given the fact that 
the EPA has only enforced the sanctions one time in the history 
of the statute,236 one might argue that even that kind of change 
would be modest—but the fact that EPA has infrequently 
enforced the sanctions could just as easily suggest that the 
threat of enforcement alone was effective. If the threat of 
Sebelius litigation served to undermine the overall culture of 
enforcement within the statutory partnership, it could prove 
devastating to the goals of the CAA. 
One final point of legal analysis warrants mention here. If 
the CAA were challenged for exceeding the new Sebelius limit, 
it would be tempting to argue that even if the sanction did 
somehow violate the new spending-power limit, its terms are 
independently authorized under the Commerce Clause.237 
 
 234. In a facial challenge, the plaintiff argues that the law is unconstitutional 
“on its face,” meaning that the law cannot be applied constitutionally in any 
circumstance. An as-applied challenge argues that the law functions 
unconstitutionally in a specified circumstance, even if it may be constitutionally 
applied in other circumstances. The latter is much easier to prove, but its 
individualized remedy is less satisfying because the overall law remains intact. 
 235. Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 87, at 920 (“[I]f the Administrator were to shut 
off all federal highway funds to a state based on the state’s failure to provide a 
sufficient response to stationary sources of pollution, her actions would raise 
serious questions under the Chief Justice’s opinion.”). 
 236. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.  
 237. For example, the Fourth Circuit upheld the CAA against a federalism 
challenge in Virginia v. Browner in 1996, 80 F.3d 869, 881 (4th Cir. 1996), holding 
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Sebelius doesn’t alter Congress’s settled commerce authority to 
regulate air pollution, but it is important to note that 
challenges to the highway fund sanctions focus on an 
independent issue. 
Even if Congress can regulate polluters directly under the 
Commerce Clause, there is a separate constitutional question 
about whether Congress can secure state participation in 
implementing the CAA. Here, the issue is whether the federal 
government is impermissibly compelling state implementation 
of the Clean Air Act, a federal regulatory program, in violation 
of the Tenth Amendment. In cases like Sweat v. Hull238 and 
Missouri v. United States,239 challengers argued that the threat 
of sanctions unconstitutionally coerced the states to participate 
in the federal program, in violation of the Tenth Amendment 
anti-commandeering doctrine.240 Notably, these suits failed. 
However, the Sebelius decision alters some of this 
precedent.241 These earlier decisions grounded the overall CAA 
in commerce authority but relied explicitly on the consent 
theory of the spending power to immunize the highway 
sanctions against coercion claims. Thanks to the crossover 
characteristics of the sanctions, the spending-power basis of 
these decisions could have less force after Sebelius. 
Still, the change will most likely prove a distinction 
without a difference. Even without the old spending-power 
precedent, coercion claims should be easily refuted by the lack 
of coercion in fact, given the distinguishable nature of the CAA 
sanctions and the fact that states can avoid the risk of 
sanctions entirely by opting for direct EPA regulation from a 
FIP. Even the landmark New Federalism anti-commandeering 
decision, New York v. United States, affirmed that the Tenth 
 
that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate “activities causing air 
or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more 
than one State” (internal quotations omitted). At least one federal court has gone 
as far as to hold that air pollution is itself interstate commerce. United States v. 
Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968). 
 238. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (D. Ariz. 2001) (rejecting Tenth Amendment defense 
of state’s unilateral decision to terminate pollution controls provided for in State 
Implementation Plan under Clean Air Act). 
 239. 918 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge 
to Clean Air Act requirements for State Implementation Plans). 
 240. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
 241. See, e.g., Joondeph, supra note 15, at 833 (discussing how Sebelius altered 
the anti-commandeering doctrine and the implication this may have on federal 
regulation of state and local taxation). 
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Amendment is satisfied when Congress presents the states 
with a choice of at least one constitutional alternative.242 
IV. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AFTER SEBELIUS: CHANGING 
THE DYNAMICS OF STATE-FEDERAL BARGAINING 
The CAA thus has good chances in court, but of course, 
that is not the end of Sebelius’s impact. In environmental law 
and elsewhere, Sebelius will be felt not in the outcomes of 
litigation but in the changed dynamics of state-federal 
bargaining. In the context of interjurisdictional governance, 
statutes and litigation frame the outer boundaries of a working 
relationship that is more wholly comprised of negotiation, 
consultation, and competition.243 It is within this fabric of 
state-federal exchange that the most federalism-sensitive 
governance takes place,244 and this is where Sebelius takes 
aim. This Part briefly considers how Sebelius may change the 
dynamics of intergovernmental bargaining between state and 
federal actors. 
On the surface, the doctrine is designed to favor states’ 
interests over federal interests, and at least on the surface of 
state-federal relations, it will do so. As a result of Sebelius, the 
states will have more leverage when negotiating the future 
terms of spending-power bargains and enforcement. This is 
“Negotiation 101”: the better a state’s chances in court, or the 
costlier it will be for the agency to determine the legal limit, 
the stronger the state’s bargaining position becomes at the 
table. Even setting aside the costs of litigation at a time of 
strained budgets, a risk-averse agency may shy away from 
enforcing even defensible terms just to avoid the fallout from 
federalism lawsuits that can easily become political lightning 
rods. 
Indeed, we have learned from previous environmental 
federalism controversies that the threat of litigation—even 
litigation that is unlikely to be successful—can profoundly 
change the way that the implementing federal agencies behave, 
especially when the Court’s ruling creates considerable 
 
 242. New York, 505 U.S. at 176 (1992). 
 243. See generally Ryan, supra note 18; RYAN, supra note 7, at 265–314 (both 
discussing negotiated federalism as a general enterprise of interjurisdictional 
governance). 
 244. Id. 
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uncertainty. For example, after two Supreme Court decisions 
clouded the extent of federal Clean Water Act authority to 
regulate wetlands, the federal agencies substantially pulled 
back from enforcement efforts in realms of regulatory 
uncertainty.245 An investigation in 2010 reported that nearly 
1,500 major water pollution investigations had been dropped 
due to the difficulty of establishing jurisdiction after these 
decisions.246 
As a result of this shift in leverage, Congress will be more 
cautious in drafting laws that create spending-power 
partnerships, and agencies will be more hesitant in 
implementing them. Indeed, the EPA may capitulate more 
easily in negotiating compliance under the CAA, and it will 
certainly be less likely to press for the kinds of penalties that 
could prompt a Sebelius challenge. Of course, the EPA could 
also seek closure by isolating a test case and using it to 
establish clearer limits—but it is unlikely to do so before the 
current Court, which came so close in Sebelius to limiting the 
commerce authority on which so many environmental laws are 
premised. In addition, states may continue the trend of 
negotiating towards individualized waivers from more 
generally applicable laws, and the EPA may be more receptive. 
Federal lawmaking may also shift after Sebelius. 
Assuming it withstands Sebelius scrutiny as I suggest above, 
the “FIP Model” of conditional preemption—allowing states the 
choice between direct federal regulation and state 
implementation of federal goals—is likely to become a fixture 
in spending-power partnerships far beyond environmental law. 
Indeed, one scholar intimate with the development of the ACA 
suggests that if the drafters could do it again, they would likely 
have structured some sort of federal fallback provision (like the 
FIP alternative) into the Medicaid expansion.247 The FIP model 
 
 245. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2252 (2006); Solid Waste 
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001). 
 246. Charles Duhigg & Janet Roberts, Rulings Restrict Clean Water Act, 
Foiling EPA, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/ 
us/01water.html?emc=eta. 
 247. Professor Sara Rosenbaum, email correspondence of April 7, 2014 (on file 
with author); see also Sara Rosenbaum, Open Exchanges to the Poor in States that 
Opt Out of Medicaid, ROLL CALL (July 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/open_exchanges_to_the_poor_in_states_that_opt_out
_of_medicaid_commentary-226677-1.html. Professor Rosenbaum teaches at the 
Milken Institute School of Public Health at George Washington University. 
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will protect the core constitutional concern of the Sebelius 
doctrine, which is to preserve genuine state choice (although, 
as in the case of the CAA, some states may well dislike both 
alternatives). 
Another feature for export from the Clean Air Act may be 
its model of carefully tailored, proportional sanctions, which 
may prove more resilient against challenges of coercion. In 
certain governance contexts, especially those prone to the 
pronounced geographical diversity that environmental 
management often confronts, proportional sanctions are a more 
equitable alternative to the all-or-nothing alternative of the 
Medicaid model. Indeed, even the ACA would have benefited 
from more formal statutory recognition for the informal 
sanctioning discretion that some experts claim the Secretary 
had all along.248 However, proportional sanctions may reduce 
the overall force of sanctioning threats, which could complicate 
interjurisdictional governance where national uniformity 
rightly takes precedence over local diversity.249 
Nevertheless, although the Sebelius doctrine is designed to 
advance state interests, the resulting changes in state-federal 
dynamics could also harm the interests of states. Fear of 
liability and uncertainty may prompt Congress to reduce or 
avoid state-federal partnerships in regulatory arenas where 
states might prefer them.250 Congress may lean toward smaller 
federal grants in cooperative programs of more limited 
duration, or toward programs that bypass the states entirely to 
avoid Sebelius impacts.251 Sebelius is intended to enhance the 
 
 248. Interview with Professor Barbara Safriet, Portland, OR (Oct. 22, 2013). 
Professor Safriet was the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Lecturer in 
Health Law at Yale Law School, and she currently teaches at Lewis & Clark Law 
School. 
 249. Ryan, supra note 18, at 66–69 (discussing the advantages of local diversity 
and national uniformity in market-related regulatory contexts of motor vehicle 
emissions and carbon markets). 
 250. Cf. Metzger, supra note 14, at 87 (arguing that Sebelius “may carry the 
seeds of its own irrelevance. By cabining money and potentially making it less 
effective as a regulatory tool, NFIB may encourage a return to centralized 
programs and direct regulatory approaches, or—more likely—a switch to more 
discretionary financial incentives. Such a move to greater discretion is already 
well afoot in many cooperative-federalism contexts. The net result may well be a 
change in the form of federal measures, but little restriction on the scope of 
federal power.”). 
 251. See Pasachoff, supra note 135, at 651 (concluding that Sebelius is unlikely 
to impact federal education grants no matter how large they are, but that it is still 
likely to affect the future of federal education law by changing the architecture of 
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power of states negotiating with a formidable federal partner, 
but this new leverage is only meaningful to the extent the 
federal government remains at the bargaining table. 
Justice Ginsburg flagged exactly this problem in her 
dissent, where she worried that the combined effect of these 
impacts could perversely act to limit state influence in 
interjurisdictional governance.252 She warned that “[t]he 
alternative to conditional federal spending, it bears emphasis, 
is not state autonomy but state marginalization,”253 and 
contrasted the history of the Medicaid spending partnership 
with the fully federal Medicare program: 
In 1965, Congress elected to nationalize health coverage for 
seniors through Medicare. It could similarly have 
established Medicaid as an exclusively federal program. 
Instead, Congress gave the States the opportunity to 
partner in the program’s administration and development. 
Absent from the nationalized model, of course, is the state-
level policy discretion and experimentation that is 
Medicaid’s hallmark; undoubtedly the interests of 
federalism are better served when States retain a 
meaningful role in the implementation of a program of such 
importance.254 
Indeed, the reason that all but a handful of states elect to 
design air quality state implementation plans under the Clean 
Air Act and approve water pollution discharge permits under 
the Clean Water Act is that they prefer the resulting autonomy 
and engagement to direct federal regulation by the EPA. The 
Sebelius anti-coercion doctrine is all about preserving state 
choice, but sometimes the state’s best choice is an 
intergovernmental partnership. After all this, it would be a 
great shame (and an even greater irony) if a doctrine intended 
to foster state autonomy inadvertently acted to undermine it. 
Moreover, Sebelius could harm both state and federal 
interests by making it more difficult for the federal government 
 
state-federal partnerships). 
 252. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text (discussing this argument 
in her dissent). 
 253. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2632–33 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
 254. Id. 
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to make adjustments to existing spending partnerships. If 
federal actors fear the uncertain point at which statutory 
amendments create independent obligations and crossover 
conditions, fewer changes will be made—even positive changes 
that might assist the ultimate beneficiaries of regulation, the 
American public. For example, Congress will (hopefully) learn 
from its experiences in the early years of the expanded 
Medicaid program. But as discussed earlier, will the threat of 
ongoing litigation—and perhaps the requirement of a third 
track of a state-elected Medicaid option—blunt the enthusiasm 
of lawmakers and agency personnel to adopt responsive 
reforms?255 
Finally, the doctrine could also inhibit the kinds of 
integrative creativity in intergovernmental bargaining that 
accrues to the benefit of all parties.256 As one former state 
attorney explained, the state attorney general’s office often 
advised the legislature that the state’s interests in 
interjurisdictional governance are best served by maintaining 
maximum flexibility in both directions, preserving the largest 
possible scope of state-federal bargaining.257 As he noted, 
limiting federal discretion out of ideological opposition to 
federal power does not necessarily correspond to more 
beneficial outcomes for the state.258 
Win-win solutions often require that both sides be enabled 
to bargain freely with many sources of trade, including not only 
tangible resources like funding, technical expertise, and other 
forms of governance capacity, but also intangible resources 
such as regulatory authority, permissions, political credit, and 
normative principles.259 Because the Sebelius doctrine limits 
 
 255. See supra text following note 132 (discussing the possibility of multiple 
Medicaid tracks). 
 256. See generally Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, & Dealing: The Problems and 
Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337 (2002) 
(analyzing the theoretical disconnect between the Supreme Court’s anti-
bargaining takings jurisprudence and the potential for integrative bargaining in 
land use planning). 
 257. Interview with Professor H. Jefferson Powell, former special counsel to 
the Attorney General for the State of North Carolina, New York, NY (Mar. 14, 
2014). Professor Powell has served in a variety of state and federal positions over 
the years, most recently as deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of legal 
Counsel at the United States Department of Justice. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See RYAN, supra note 7, 326–38 (discussing the various sources of trade in 
state-federal negotiations), 356–67 (discussing expanded possibilities for 
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the permissible scope of state-federal bargaining in new and 
uncertain ways, it has the potential to hamper the creativity 
and flexibility of all parties in ways that could prevent state-
federal bargaining from reaching the Pareto frontier. 
CONCLUSION 
This, then, is what environmental law looks like after 
Sebelius—and indeed, how much regulatory law is likely to 
appear. The foregoing analysis teases apart the elements of the 
new spending-power limit and applies it to a body of law with 
many spending-power partnerships, in order to explore its 
impact on cooperative federalism more generally. The analysis 
is useful both to understand the prospects of environmental 
federalism as we know it, and to explore how the new doctrine 
will interact with state-federal partnerships in all areas of law. 
After Sebelius, programs of cooperative federalism may 
exceed the spending power when (1) the new offer changes the 
terms of an entrenched partnership, (2) the new offer 
conditions existing funds on compliance with indirectly related 
terms, and (3) the size of the grant at issue is so large that the 
state could not forgo it without excessive economic harm. 
In environmental law, only the CAA potentially triggers all 
three elements, and it is distinguishable from the Medicaid 
example because states can avoid the penalty entirely by 
allowing EPA to regulate in-state polluters directly. The size of 
the implicated funds is also much smaller than those held 
coercive in Sebelius, and the CAA provides substantial 
discretion to the agency to avoid the all-or-nothing coerciveness 
that the Court disparaged in Sebelius. The fact that the 
program has been in operation for so long may also mitigate 
the frustration of states’ reliance interests that drove the 
plurality’s analysis of the ACA Medicaid expansion. 
Nevertheless, the impacts of the doctrine may extend far 
beyond the courtroom. As the post-SWANNC/Rapanos wetland 
cases demonstrate, the threat of even uncertain litigation can 
seriously alter the norms of statutory implementation. The 
Sebelius doctrine will change the dynamics of state-federal 
bargaining within programs of cooperative federalism in ways 
 
integrative bargaining in state-federal negotiations); see also Ryan, supra note 18, 
at 86–101, 121–34 (same). 
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that may surprise its architects. Some changes may favor state 
interests, increasing their leverage at the negotiating table and 
reducing the threat of sanctions for regulatory noncompliance. 
Others may redound to their detriment, prompting federal 
lawmakers to circumscribe spending-power partnerships in 
ways that marginalize state influence, or avoid state-federal 
partnerships altogether. 
Meanwhile, and despite its substantial flaws, the Sebelius 
decision exposes a problem in spending-power bargaining that 
fairly warrants our attention: that is, how the analysis shifts 
when the states are not opting in or out of a cooperative-
federalism program from scratch, but after having developed 
substantial infrastructure around a long-term partnership. 
The states, like people, sometimes have to make 
uncomfortable choices between undesirable alternatives, and 
this alone should not undermine genuine consent. But 
admittedly, most of us build the infrastructure of our lives 
around agreements that will (hopefully) last longer than one 
fiscal year. The Chief Justice’s analysis should provoke at least 
a little sympathy for the occasionally vulnerable position of 
states that have seriously invested in an ongoing federal 
partnership that suddenly changes.260 (Indeed, those 
sympathetic to the ACA but frustrated with No Child Left 
Behind’s impositions on dissenting states should consider how 
to distinguish them.)261 
 
 260. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Federalis(m) Society, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
941, 946 (2013) (discussing how Chief Justice Roberts’ decision represented a 
rough “effort to think about how to regulate the ongoing, iterative relationship 
between the States and the federal government when they partner.”). As 
Professor Gerken writes, “[t]he Chief Justice wanted to ensure that the principal 
cannot pull the rug out from under the agent, even when the agent rebels. It may 
not be the right way to think about cooperative and uncooperative federalism, but 
it is an effort to think about it.” Id. See also Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda 
for Uncooperative Federalists, 48 TULSA L. REV. 427, 434 (2013) (suggesting 
further exploration of “whether (and when) uncooperative federalism is 
normatively attractive,” “how uncooperative federalism actually works under 
particular statutory schemes and how constitutional doctrine might enhance it,” 
and “underlying motivational questions about why state officials would want to 
engage in uncooperative dissenting behavior”). 
 261. See, e.g., Sierra Fisher, Compulsory Accountability Renders the No Child 
Left Behind Act Unconstitutional: The Texas Education Agency’s Ultimate Tool to 
Ensure Its Waiver from the Department of Education, 14 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L. J. 
467, 480–81 (2013) (discussing how the Texas Education Agency may be 
successful in challenging the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) as 
unconstitutionally coercive because NCLB is a major alteration to a longstanding 
governmental program and Congress passed NCLB as a conditional spending 
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It is important to take bargaining consent seriously, 
because an awful lot of American governance really is 
negotiated between state and federal actors.262 Supplanting 
appropriately legislative judgment with incoherent judicial 
rules seems like the wrong response, but perhaps the political 
branches can do more to address the problem. For example, to 
avoid coerced consent after amending an ongoing program, 
Congress could provide states a phase-out period to ramp down 
from a previous partnership without having to simultaneously 
ramp up to new requirements—effectively creating a COBRA 
policy for states voluntarily leaving a partnership.263 This 
would create additional administrative challenges, but surely it 
would be preferable to the thicket of confusion Sebelius creates 
by allowing judicial declarations of new legislative programs 
for the express purpose of judicial federalism review. 
While the new doctrine thus legitimately focuses our 
attention on matters of fairness in state-federal bargaining, it 
is not yet clear whether it will accomplish its greater goal. In 
the end, the great project of American federalism is to inform 
interjurisdictional governance with the appropriate balance of 
local and national perspectives, expertise, and values.264 At the 
moment, it is hard to see how far Sebelius will advance that 
project; only time will tell. In the meanwhile, we can at least 
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